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Abstract
The concept of business incubators has attracted much attention in recent years, 
both as descriptive of an increasingly important phenomenon and as an effective 
public intervention in the economies of lagging cities, regions, and countries.  
However, little empirical research has explored this phenomenon.  
To better understand what type of relationships contribute to the performance of 
newly hatched business ideas, the following study applies a social capital and 
proximity lenses to explore relationships in business incubation and how they 
contribute to start-up performance.
Through the use of open-ended questions this study carried out semi-structured 
interviews with 25 total participants of the New Zealand incubation system.  These 
in-depth interviews allowed participants to express their perspectives on business 
incubation.
This study revealed that there are tensions that exist in the incubator environment 
which are as much about the relationship between the two central participants - 
incubator personnel and entrepreneur - and other stakeholders, as between the 
two central participants themselves.  These tensions, if not aligned, restrict 
incubating entrepreneurs from gaining advantage from business incubators.  
Additionally, the study reveals that the role of geographical proximity in business 
incubation is surprisingly of less importance than other forms of proximity.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
New Zealand’s GDP has lagged noticeably over the last five years.  Between 2006 
and 2010, the economy’s growth rate stayed below 3% and during 2008 and 2009, 
it fell below zero (World Development Indicators, 2011).  The New Zealand 
Treasury has credited the poor performance to several underlying determinants 
including deficiencies in entrepreneurship and innovation (Ministry of Economic 
Development (MED), 2011).  This evaluation, however, seems unusual since Kiwi 
ingenuity has contributed to the country’s recent advancements in agriculture, 
science, screen and digital, and information media telecommunications (e.g. New 
Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), 2011a).  One might expect that these 
advancements are creating new businesses or allowing current businesses to 
develop, but this is not necessarily the case.  New Zealand’s innovations are 
failing to earn enough dollars to help the country’s economy achieve its needed 
growth.  To assist in this effort and bridge the gap between innovation and 
economic development, the New Zealand government has laid out initiatives to 
cultivate entrepreneurship and innovation.
As Shane and Venkataraman (2000) indicate, entrepreneurship is a relatively new 
and undefined field of study.  Most academics have defined the field strictly in 
terms of who the entrepreneur is and what he or she does without incorporating 
other contributing factors (Venkataraman, 1997).  Entrepreneurship is not simply a 
person, or team, who establishes a new organization.  Instead, as Shane and 
Venkataraman (2000) argue, researchers must begin to think of entrepreneurship 
more broadly beyond the individual.  In that spirit, this paper will define 
entrepreneurship as an interdisciplinary field that includes the examination of how, 
by whom, and with what effects the opportunities to create future goods and 
services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited.  In other words, the study of 
entrepreneurship involves investigating the characteristics of entrepreneurs, the 
sources for their opportunities, and the execution of those opportunities (Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000).
Entrepreneurs typically do not have all of the necessary resources to address 
these market needs and they require additional tools to begin successful trading 
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(e.g. Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  Capital, business strategy, and relationships 
with key partners, for example, are absolutely essential for the entrepreneur to 
meet the market’s specific needs.  As a remedy to these obstacles, the market has 
witnessed the emergence of business incubators, which act as catalysts that 
empower entrepreneurs by connecting them with such necessary tools (Peters, et 
al., 2004).
Business incubators have been adopted by the New Zealand government as a tool 
to help entrepreneurs develop new businesses that have the potential to positively 
contribute to the country’s economic growth.  To help raise the country’s GDP 
above the bottom half of the OECD rankings, Auckland-based incubator The 
Icehouse argues that the country needs 3000 new high-growth, internationally-
focused companies by 2020 (Fletcher, 2011, October 1).  In New Zealand, 
business incubation is a government-led tool that tries to address some regional 
and national economic needs through the cultivation of start-ups which have high-
growth potential.  To date, studies on business incubation have helped 
researchers and practitioners to understand only portions of the phenomenon, 
leaving significant opportunities for future research, as Hackett and Dilts (2004) 
argue.  Much of the incubation research has been focused around developing 
various frameworks for identifying and tracking incubator success and 
performance.  These frameworks have been targeted to academic literature (e.g. 
Hackett and Dilts, 2004a; Mian, 1997; Phan et al., 2005; Grimaldi and Grandi, 
2005) as well as practitioner publications (e.g. OECD, 1999; Erlewine, 2007).  
However, despite a variety of proposed frameworks, there is yet to be a 
comprehensive grid that tracks the success and performance of incubation.  Other 
incubation-related research has focused more on the different elements of 
incubation from the process of selecting incubator tenants (e.g. Aerts et al. 2007) 
to system development and policy formation of incubating start-ups (Bearse, 
1998).  
But, as previous research has shown - to understand the practical performance of 
institutions, one must first explore the social context within which they operate 
(Putnam, 1994).  Scholars have shown that knowledge of the social situation can 
be an effective way to better understand diverse topics from sociology, to political 
and organizational studies (Adler and Kwon, 2002).  Exploring the impact of the 
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sociocultural, though not necessarily a conventional approach, is a longstanding 
tradition in many fields.  During his travels to America, for example, Alexis de 
Tocqueville (Democracy in America 2000) explored the country’s new democracy 
and found that it could help to reduce inequality gaps between the poor and the 
rich, a context quite different from France at that time.  As apart of one of his 
conclusions, he found that through association, Americans were able to overcome 
their selfish differences to create a spirited civil society (p. 19).  Following in 
Tocqueville’s tradition of exploring social situations, the French philosopher and 
self-taught anthropologist and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu discovered that an 
individual’s external environments or social mechanisms permit certain individual 
experiences to occur (Du Gay et al., 2000).  People will naturally begin to view 
their life as distinctive without considering the valuable societal structures that 
have directly contributed to their current state (p. 300).  Building on these previous 
strands of research, Putnam et al. (1994), in his study in Italy’s regional 
government model, found that the practical performance of institutions are shaped 
by the social context within which they operate.  
Business incubator literature has begun to understand the importance of the social 
context, relationships, and the networks of relationships in business incubation.  
For example, recent studies have shed light on the importance of the incubator 
manager-entrepreneur relationship (e.g. Rice, 2002), the impact of the incubator’s 
and entrepreneur’s networks (Sa and Lee, 2012), internal network formation 
(Lichtenstein, 1992), and the incubator-industry network (e.g. Hansen et al. 2000).  
Of the previous incubator research, few empirical studies have investigated 
incubation and even fewer have looked at the relational dynamics of incubation.  
Recently, Sa and Lee (2012) identified relational dynamics between the different 
networks in a business incubator.  Even so, previous research has failed to 
provide an empirical window for seeing how relationships in incubation are formed, 
the ways in which actors help to ensure they maximize their relational benefits, the 
relational dynamics between the different actors in a business incubator, and their 
effect on incubator performance.  Building on this previous literature, this study 
further investigates the social aspects of relationships in business incubators.  
By conducting research at four different incubators with current and previous 
incubator tenants as well as incubator practitioners, this empirical study has the 
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potential to be interesting and helpful for academics involved with business 
incubation, entrepreneurship, and economic development literature.  This study 
may also grow to serve as a resource for incubator managers as well as individual 
entrepreneurs who are contemplating enrolling in an incubator programme.
The following paper reports on the findings of the study.  The first section 
discusses the current literature dealing with business incubator performance, 
followed by an explanation of the methodology used for the research element.  
Finally, the findings of the research will be reported and then discussed, with a 
concluding section that outlines suggested next steps for further research in this 
space.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Entrepreneurship trends indicate that more people than ever are launching new 
business ventures. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, which is composed of 
academics from a diverse set of universities, recently estimated that in 2010, 110 
million people between the ages of 18 and 64 were actively involved in starting 
businesses (Kelley et al., 2011).  However, start-ups typically have relatively low 
success rates and most are inevitably forced to close up shop within their first year 
of existence (Dunne et al., 1988).  According to a study done by the Organization 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), one-third of European 
start-ups, on average, fail in their first year of existence (OECD, 2002).  Author 
David B. Audretsch (1991) illustrates this phenomenon by pointing out that very 
few start-ups ever actually displace current industry leaders.  But instead, 
entrepreneurs typically address a hole in a market when the production and sale of 
goods or services has failed to produce its desired outcome.  In other words, new 
business opportunities arise when competitive imperfections appear in a 
marketplace.  When this occurs, start-ups have the chance to capitalize on market 
failure by filling market gaps.  However, it has always been a bit of a mystery as to 
why some entrepreneurs succeed and others fail.  Research has pointed to a host 
of reasons, including the personal characteristics of entrepreneurs (e.g. Kirzner, 
1973; Bruderl et al., 1992; Alvarez and Barney, 2007) and a lack of economic 
development tools such as business incubators which, in theory, help connect 
entrepreneurs with the resources they need (e.g. Bergek and Norrman, 2008).
In order to better understand this space, literature has been assembled from three 
main areas.  The following chapter will discuss these main topics of literature, 
which include: entrepreneurship, business incubation, and social capital.  
Additional literature from other related fields will be incorporated into the review 
where appropriate.  The following, then, does not seek to be a complete literature 
review of any one space but instead is a compilation of several different areas.  
For comprehensive reviews of incubation literature, see Hackett and Dilts (2004). 
For an introduction to entrepreneurship, see Venkataraman and Shane (2000), 
and see Putnam (2001) for a strong narrative into the nature and impact of social 
capital.
5
2.1 Entrepreneurship
 
A diverse pool of research into the characteristics of entrepreneurs has revealed 
that these individuals appear to posses unique traits that help them first to 
discover an idea, and then to exploit it.  Additional research also indicates that 
particular opportunities contribute to start-up frequency.  
2.1.1 Discover an Idea
Literature tends to show that certain people discover entrepreneurial opportunities 
because of their unique cognitive abilities.  Kirzner (1973) argues that 
entrepreneurs have a unique ʻalertnessʼ that gives them the eyes to identify new 
business opportunities, whereas non-entrepreneurs might have similar knowledge 
and experiences as an entrepreneur but remain blind to the market gaps.  Baron 
(1999) argues, for example, that entrepreneurs will discover and address market 
gaps because they are less likely to spend time and effort feeling regret over 
missed opportunities – imagining what might have been – and are more likely to 
persevere, even in times of difficulty, rather than falling into inaction.  Cooper et al., 
(1988) argue that entrepreneurs have high levels of optimism and they perceive 
their chances of success to be much higher than they actually are – even higher 
than others in their industry would project.  Entrepreneurs, regardless of the 
industry, face skepticism from others.  To combat these external doubts, Chen et 
al., (1998) argues that individuals with greater self-efficacy and more internal locus 
of control are more likely to realise their ideas.  McClelland (1967) in particular 
argues that entrepreneurs require high levels of achievement.  Since the 
exploitation of an opportunity has the potential to produce remarkable rewards, 
high-achievement minded individuals are more likely to act on opportunities to see 
them realised (McClelland, 1967).  Entrepreneurs tend to exhibit a much higher 
willingness to bear risk than managers of established firms  (e.g. Stewart and 
Roth, 2001).   Alvarez and Barney (2007) go on to find entrepreneurs are endowed 
with unique characteristics that allow them to see and realise new business 
opportunities by tapping into their past knowledge.  Many times the unique 
knowledge that an entrepreneur holds is proprietary information not held by 
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anyone else, since it has been uniquely obtained through their particular life 
circumstances (Venkataraman, 1997).  Prior information could also stem from past 
industry work experience.  
We see entrepreneur’s communicating traits which they perceive as common 
amongst themselves and their peer entrepreneurs.  In a 1995 Wired interview, 
Apple co-founder Steve Jobs discussed the importance of an individual’s personal 
characteristics and experience in the act of connecting previous knowledge to 
produce something new and creative.  Jobs commented: 
 
Creativity is just connecting things. When you ask creative people how they 
did something, they feel a little guilty because they didn't really do it, they just 
saw something. It seemed obvious to them after a while. That's because they 
were able to connect experiences they've had and synthesize new things. 
And the reason they were able to do that was that they've had more 
experiences or they have thought more about their experiences than other 
people (Wolf, 1995).   
Similarly, Ward et al. (1997) argued that individuals vary in their ability to combine 
particular knowledge and concepts into new ideas.  However, execution of an idea 
is what separates an entrepreneur from someone with only an ‘idea’.  
Management guru Peter Drucker (1999) once famously said: “ideas are cheap and 
abundant; what is of value is the effective placement of those ideas into situations 
that develop into action.”  In other words, ideas are nothing without effective 
execution - it is the realization of an idea that matters most.
 
2.1.2 Realise an Idea
Authors have argued widely that there are distinctive cognitive attributes which 
allow entrepreneurs to realise opportunities that others would only dream about.  It 
is still the subject of much debate as to whether this characteristic is innate and 
specific to the individual or acquired over years of life and work experience.  
Whereas Bruderl et al. (1992), found that a founders work and school experience 
greatly matters in the survival of an established firm, Cooper et al. (1989) argue 
that entrepreneurs are more likely to exploit opportunities if they have gained 
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useful information from their previous employment.  This includes not only 
information about how to be an entrepreneur, but also valuable industry and other 
business-related knowledge.  Although the broad category of business-related 
knowledge could include a variety of topics, entrepreneurs typically are in need of 
strategic knowledge and operational knowledge which they often source through 
different advisors whereas topics of finance, accounting, or legal operations would 
fall under either of the two categories depending on the particular issue.
Advisory support, whether it is strategic or operational, can be the key resource 
that propels a start-up toward success.  Whereas organizational knowledge 
concerns the day-to-day running of a venture, strategy is the master plan of a 
business.  
Strategic Knowledge
Strategy is a plan of action that helps to achieve an overall aim and it typically 
comes with policies, programmes, or tactics that help actualize this intension.  The 
formation of strategy tends to be different from firm to firm.  Some companies 
might lean on traditional strategic planning, as illustrated in the Design School 
approach (e.g. Mintzberg, 1990), whereas others might follow the trial and 
experience approach laid out by Mintzberg (1987); a synthesis of approaches such 
as logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1978), or even the balanced scorecard (Kaplan, 
1992) is also imaginable.
Traditional business strategy methods reflect a top-down approach whereby 
management is responsible for the firmʼs strategy (e.g. Andrews, 1971; Mintzberg, 
1990; Ansoff, 1991). The Design School was developed by the Business Policy 
group of the Harvard Business School in the 1960ʼs and classically exemplifies 
traditional strategic thinking. The school encourages management to escape to an 
isolated room to seek and secure the best fit between external threats and 
opportunities and internal strengths and weaknesses. The result of these steps is 
a fully formed strategy (Mintzberg, 1990).
In response to earlier models, emerging approaches to strategy such as 
Mintzbergʼs trial and experience help to combat the ever changing marketplace by 
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encouraging management to move out from the isolated back room and start 
implementing to figure out what works (Mintzberg, 1990). For a variety of reasons 
whether they be societal, technological, or a result of globalization, there is 
generally an increased competition amongst todayʼs businesses (e.g. Friedman, 
2007).  In order to keep up, companies are continuously evaluating new 
approaches to strategy so that they might fuel faster reaction time and drive 
quicker growth.
Operational Knowledge
Operational knowledge concerns everything from hiring methods and employee 
motivation to the processes for creating annual budgets.  Whereas strategic 
guidance can be a continuous need for entrepreneurs, operational knowledge 
tends to be gleaned more systematically from previous experience, meaning that 
experienced entrepreneurs typically come to their start-up more prepared to solve 
operational issues than strategic ones.  One way to explain this difference is to 
look at the broader context in which business exists in much of today’s market-
focused world, namely a continuously changing and evolving landscape.  In 
economic terms, the free market is constantly searching for its equilibrium and as 
such, is in perpetual transition.  Although the concept that business is always in 
motion is mostly accurate, there are particular industries and business that tend to 
be more stable than others.  For example, those industries that are more 
geographically diverse and which deal in consumer products tend to persist more 
through economic downturns than do fashion designers (e.g. Adams, 2011).  
Additionally, the process of starting a business is a creative and typically nonlinear 
experience, leaving entrepreneurs to discover or find a new path through the 
ambiguous landscape. 
2.1.3 Opportunism
Though the canon of research points to entrepreneurship as a characteristic or 
cognitive difference of an individual, there exists another body of other research 
which argues instead or in addition to cognitive characteristics, there are other 
factors, particularly financial ones, which propel individuals into starting and 
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sustaining new ventures.   For example, Kirzner (1973) points to the potential 
financial benefit implicit in an entrepreneurial idea as a key driver in the actual 
realization of the idea.  Evans and Leighton (1989) find that individuals are prone 
to launch into entrepreneurship simply because an individual has built up a 
stockpile of financial capital.  However, Kirzner (1973) went on to argue that for an 
idea to be realised, an entrepreneur must believe the reward will outweigh any 
initial investment of time and resources.  Years earlier, Schmookler (1966) found 
that the exploitation of an idea is more common when demand is expected to be 
particularly high.  Similarly, Dunne et al., (1988) found that entrepreneurs are more 
inclined to act if industry profit margins are significant or if the industry has 
relatively low barriers to entry (Acs and Audretsch, 1987) or the low cost of capital 
(Shane, 1996).  Additionally, Hannan and Freeman (1984) discovered that for new 
ideas to be realised, the field of competition must be neither too low nor too high.  
Taken together, research remains inconclusive as to how and why an individual 
finds an idea and then successfully launches a new venture.  Nonetheless, 
research points to the cognitive characteristics of an entrepreneur and the 
business opportunity as key drivers.  Research also indicates that despite an 
individuals cognitive ability to realise an opportunity, they require other resources 
that include advisory knowledge.  This is where business incubation steps in.
2.2 Business Incubation
Although an entrepreneur’s characteristics, the draw of the financial rewards, or a 
mix of the two can help propel an individual into launching a new business, there 
are also economic development initiatives like business incubators that help to pair 
these individuals with other essential start-up tools.  Business incubators have 
long addressed this gap by helping to connect entrepreneurs with the resources 
they need to start and grow successful ventures.
In recent years business incubators have experienced a rapid increase in 
popularity, so much so that numerous stakeholders have increased their 
investments. In the second quarter of 2011, US investors spent 7.5 billion USD 
worth of venture capital on incubators, up from 2.5 billion in the second quarter of 
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1995 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011).  The rise in incubator interest is also 
reflected in the sheer number of incubators in operation today. The National 
Business Incubation Association (NBIA) reports that the number of incubators in 
North America in 1980 totaled 12, and in 2006 that number grew to more than 
1,400, with 1,115 in the US, 191 in Mexico, and 120 in Canada (Knopp, 2007).  
The United Kingdom Business Incubator Association (UKBI) reports that there are 
approximately 300 active business incubators in the UK alone (UKBI: Business 
Incubation, 2011).  Most of which are organised on behalf of the government to 
serve as an economic development tool.
2.2.1 Definition and Structure
According to Aerts et al. (2007), the first reported incubator was started as far back 
as 1959 by Charles Mancuso in Batavia, New York.  That year, Mancuso began 
renting space at a discounted rate in his Batavia Industrial Centre to small and 
starting companies and helped consult them through their growth process 
(Mancuso Business Development Group, 2009).  However, since Mancuso’s first 
incubator, several economic and market shifts have forced incubators to 
incorporate different models and as a result, the definition and structure of 
incubation has evolved. On the whole, researchers have tended to agree that 
incubators are comprised of four basic components.  These components include: a 
shared space, a host of different business support services such as access to 
subsidized or free accounting and legal help, consulting support or mentorship, 
and access to key contacts through internal and external networks - including 
introductions to capital sources (e.g. Hackett and Dilts, 2004a; Grimaldi and 
Grandi, 2005; Bergek and Norrman, 2008).  However, these components will be 
slightly different from one incubator to another.  For example, in his research, Mian 
(1997) discovered that university-based incubators, which help to commercialize 
university research, provide a few unique university-related services, including 
student employees, library services, and laboratory facilities.  Incubation can also 
be one of the tactics used by economic development agencies (EDAs) to help 
ignite new business development, though it is usually only one of many tools that 
EDAs provide.  Despite the incubator context researchers tend to agree that 
business incubators exist to invest in new ventures whose ideas, products, 
services, and systems are in their earliest phases and are still forming into fully 
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developed and sustainable enterprises (e.g. Hackett and Dilts, 2004a; Grimaldi 
and Grandi, 2005; Bergek and Norrman, 2008). 
In light of this previous incubator research, the following paper will define 
incubators as organisations that exist to develop emerging ventures by serving 
entrepreneurs through the provision of a portfolio of services, which can include, 
but is not limited to, shared space, business services, consulting support, and 
access to a wide array of social networks which can include access to capital 
sources. On the whole, incubators provide these services in exchange for an 
equity stake in the business.  Particular aspects of incubation, such as mentorship 
or office space, do not solely constitute incubation; instead, incubation requires the 
integration of multiple tools working in harmony for the betterment of the 
entrepreneur.  In so doing, the macro idea of incubation is that the wider 
community benefits economically from the creation of new jobs and revenue 
producing ventures.  Under this definition, business accelerators are also included, 
despite their limited duration and particular focus on technology companies (e.g. 
NBIA: Business Incubation, 2009).  
2.2.2 Incubator Research
Although incubators have existed in one form or another since the 1950’s, the 
canon of incubator literature still lacks a complete framework to define and track 
the performance of incubation by showcasing the key outcomes of benefit for 
entrepreneurs, incubators, and each of their stakeholders.  The debates around 
the performance of incubation, from both macro and micro viewpoints, is one of 
the core conversations working to unite the diverse field and create dialogue about 
what methods and techniques are actually helping entrepreneurs succeed and 
which are not.  Scholars began trying to address the problem of tracking incubator 
performance when the field began to grow in popularity in the 1980s.  Since that 
time, academic interest in this area has snowballed.  Some scholars have focused 
on developing metric templates that gauge the success of incubation by applying 
scales which take into account the goals and configurations of the particular 
incubator.  In this context, incubation is tracked by incubator type, allowing 
incubators of similar goals and configurations to be compared with one another.  
Others have sought to develop universal frameworks for benchmarking the 
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performance of incubators.  These grids are not necessarily reserved for only one 
type of incubator, but have, as the authors argue, the potential to track the 
performance of multiple types of incubation (e.g. Hackett and Dilts, 2008).  
Although incubator research has both progressed in terms of tracking incubators 
based on their unique goals and configurations as well as benchmarking 
incubators based on the same metrics, the canon still lacks a complete grid with 
which to gauge incubation performance.  The following two sections will further 
illustrate these two streams of incubator research.
Mission-based Performance
There are a handful of authors who argue that to understand an incubator, you 
must first begin by understanding the type of incubator.  In some of the earliest 
literature on the topic, authors Temali and Campbell (1984) set the standard for 
describing incubators and their configurations.  They categorized different 
incubators according to their financial sponsor, whether publicly-, non-profit-, 
university-, or privately-sponsored.  A few years later, authors Lumpkin and Ireland 
(1988) further argued that incubator qualities differ according to the type of 
incubation.  However, as the particular needs of entrepreneurs evolved, the 
common classifications did not always accurately portray the individual incubator.  
Several authors noticed this and began evaluating even further back with an 
investigation of the incubator’s goals.  Bergek and Norrman (2008), for example, 
argue that it is only possible to compare incubators of common goals since 
different ones yield different outcomes.  Some incubators might prioritize job 
creation, for example, while others might be interested in commercializing 
research.  The second goal is to take research done in universities, research 
institutions, and in firms so as to transition it into new firms through a process of 
commercialisation.  While both of these goals bear a resemblance to Grimaldi and 
Grandi’s (2005) earlier incubator model of non-profit verses for-profit, Bergek and 
Norrman’s (2008) goals differ in that they are not based solely on incubator 
funding sources. According to Bergek and Norrman (2008), it is only after an 
incubator’s goals are established that structure and then performance can be 
tracked through the five components of an incubator: selection, infrastructure, 
business support, mediation, and graduation. Each component does not hold 
equal weight, but rather, it is the unique activities in the particular components of 
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business support, selection, and mediation that help to create differentiations from 
one like-minded incubator to another.
Service-based Performance
In one of the key initial studies on incubation, Campbell and Allen (1987) argue for 
a variety of different incubator and incubatee milestones to help distinguish 
successful incubators from unsuccessful ones.  These benchmarks are based on 
the incubator services provided to incubating entrepreneurs and they range more 
or less chronologically from the creation of business networks and the participation 
of investors in providing capital for tenants to even the synergies shared between 
tenants.   Years later, however, Mian (1997) developed a more comprehensive 
method for evaluating incubators that are tied directly to universities.  Borrowing 
from management literature Miam (1997) uses four commonly accepted 
approaches to organizational effectiveness in order to provide a viable framework 
for accessing and managing university technology business incubators in the US 
context.  Although Mian’s (1997) focus was on a particular type of incubator, his 
metrics influenced other researchers including Bearse, whose 1998 framework is 
rooted in the assumption that data can be regularly gathered by the incubator, 
which readily allows for the comparison of incubators.  Using both common 
performance growth measures (e.g. the number of jobs or percent of sales growth 
over time) as well as more intangible measures (e.g. product innovation, the 
quality of the management team, and the strategic alliances formed by the 
incubate), Bearse (1998) developed incubator benchmarks by analyzing the 
activities of successful incubators.  Others since that time have built on these 
indicators, including Phillips (2002), who pointed to both the number of patent 
applications per firm and the number of discontinued businesses as two of the 
factors useful for gauging the performance of US incubators.  Authors Hackett and 
Dilts (2008) propose and validate several scales by which to gauge incubation 
success.  Their scales gauge the effectiveness of the internal incubation process 
by individually measuring selection performance, monitoring business assistance 
rigor, and resource benevolence.  Hackett and Dilts’ (2008) scales are not 
prescriptive to a particular type of incubator, but can be customized and then 
applied to incubators of differing goals and configurations.  Although performance 
measures do not show the comprehensive story of success or failure in incubators 
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(e.g. Bergek and Norrman, 2008; Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005), these strategies 
have earned the endorsement of prominent practitioner organizations such as the 
NBIA and UKBI, who advise their members to track success based on similar 
indicators.  For example, in the last 12 years, the UKBI reports that over 167 full-
time jobs have been created by their members and that 87% of their graduates 
have survived more than 5 years (UKBI: Business Incubation, 2011).  
However, research has shown that business incubator metrics alone do not show 
the full impact of incubation (Hackett and Dilts, 2004).  Incubator success is multi-
facetted and as such, universal and comprehensive performance tracking has 
proved insufficient for consistently gathering and maintaining the flow of 
information from incubator graduates. This leaves researchers, incubators, and 
associations like the NBIA without a comprehensive system for gauging incubator 
success and, consequently, without the means for establishing a universal system 
of benchmarks to grade incubator practice.
2.2.3 Dynamics of Incubation
One of the conclusions common to the majority of framework of incubation is that 
every incubator is different both in goals and services, demanding that each 
incubator be uniquely assessed.  The differences among incubators are not 
always radical or unique, but are often found in the incremental changes, the small 
tweaks, which help yield different incubator successes.  Taking notice of this, 
researchers have begun to investigate in more detail particular aspects of 
incubation.  Studies have been developed around different incubator elements 
including topics such as internal network formation (Lichtenstein, 1992), incubator-
industry network (e.g. Hansen et al. 2000), the incubator manager-entrepreneur 
relationship (e.g. Rice, 2002), and the selection processes (e.g. Aerts et al. 2007).   
Lichtenstein’s (1992) work revealed the benefits created by internal incubator 
network formation where an incubator actively facilitates networking. This could 
include activities such as conducting regular business, sharing contacts, 
equipment, and knowledge amongst tenants and with the outside community.  
Hansen et al. (2000) built on Lichtenstein (1992) and others to make the case that 
a type of incubation called the Network Incubator is more inclined to develop 
successful businesses because it creates an environment whereby the tenant 
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develops connections and relationships that provide incremental or game 
changing benefits for the start-up.  However, Hansen’s et al. (2000) work was 
solely focused on technology incubators just prior to the Dot-com bubble burst - 
leaving researchers questioning the legitimacy of his findings.  Rice (2002) later 
claims instead that it is the co-production relationship between the incubator 
manager and the entrepreneur which help to create the key benefits in incubation. 
However, he goes on to argue that in order for co-production to work, there must 
be a good fit between the tenant and the incubator manager.  For this to happen, 
tenants must be carefully selected.  With an eye towards that selection process, 
Aerts et al. (2007) discovered that a tenant survival rate is positively related to a 
more balanced screening profile and that most European incubators screen 
potential entrants based on its market or the character of the tenant’s 
management team.  
Amongst this new research, a common thread around the importance of 
relationships in incubation has woven through.  Lichtenstein (1992) presents a 
framework for how relationships are created, what interactions are possible, and 
the benefits from these interactions.  He argues that network relationship-building 
is the most important value-added component of the incubation process.  
Contemporary research has offered further clarity into this space by exploring in 
greater detail the who, what, where, how, and why of the different relationships in 
business incubation. Research has pointed to the importance of the entrepreneur 
and incubator manager (e.g. Rice, 2002), the entrepreneur and its investors 
(Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001), and the external networks outside of the 
relationship between the incubator and entrepreneur (Warren et al., (2009).  As 
Rice (2002) suggests, there is significant potential for incubator managers to 
provide valuable counsel to help tenants develop well.  However, due to the time 
intensity of this counsel, an incubator manager’s time must be strategically 
allocated to the different incubating entrepreneurs.  Additionally, the entrepreneurs 
must be ready to engage in this co-production with the incubator manager.  For 
example, the entrepreneur could have gaps in their knowledge, competencies, and 
other resources that prevent them from connecting with the incubator manager in 
co-production.  On the other hand, the incubator manager could also prevent this 
valuable council from occurring, for example, by way of their readiness to engage 
with the entrepreneur in collaboration (Rice, 2002).  Additionally, Shepherd and 
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Zacharakis (2001) discover that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists can build 
necessary trust with one another through a handful of strategies including having 
frequent and open communication with each other.  This strategy can act as a 
stimulus for other trust-building techniques and is ultimately more helpful than 
control mechanisms, a technique suggested by previous VC-entrepreneur 
relationship research (e.g. Cable and Shane, 1997).  
However, research has failed to understand the social context of incubators and 
the interconnectivity among the participants. Previous incubator studies have 
tended to isolate a specific dyadic relationship and explore its effects on the 
success of a start-up.  On the other hand, some research into the social context of 
institutions has shown the complexity of relationships within a given network, 
rather than just focusing on a particular relational pair (e.g. Putnam et al.,1993).  
Given the limited research on the topic and this particular gap, it is not surprising 
that McAdam et al. (2006) have argued for more research on the social elements 
of incubation.  Hackett and Dilts (2004) have also called for more research into 
management practices, the interactions between firms, and the interactions 
between the firms and their external networks.  Important to this discussion of 
networks and the social aspects of innovation, however, is an understanding of the 
theory of social capital.
2.3 Knowledge through Social Capital
Even though an entrepreneur may possess certain entrepreneurial characteristics 
or has partnered with an incubator to help fill gaps they might have, their start-up 
is not guaranteed success.  There are a host of other components that can be the 
difference between a successful start-up venture and one that fails.  One of those 
key entreprenurial needs is knowledge.  Davidsson and Honig (2003) discover that 
the further into the start-up process an entrepreneur progresses, the resources 
and information they require to succeed becomes more idiosyncratic.  What this 
means is that education and other programmes that promote entrepreneurship 
activities at an early start-up stage may not be the most relevant tools later on to 
help entrepreneurs succeed.  Instead, entrepreneurs reach a point in starting a 
new venture where they typically have an increased need for specialized 
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knowledge and other valuable resources (Chung and Gibbons, 1997).  One of the 
key ways to address this need is by facilitating effective knowledge transfer from 
one individual to another.  Anderson and Jack (2002) find that a need can be 
elevated by connecting an entrepreneur with an individual who has the particular 
knowledge they need.  The authors go on to discuss that this vital connection can 
result in significant opportunity to help the start-up progress past difficulties and 
eventually succeed.  In order for this knowledge transfer to work, however, some 
type of relationship must be established between the two parties.  Thus, a way to 
view one’s aptitude for building relationships is through the lens of social capital.
The roots of social capital reflect a primordial feature of social life which is that 
social ties between individuals - such as between friends - can be exploited for 
different purposes, whether it be economic, moral, psychological, or otherwise.  At 
the core of social capital theory is the notion of relationship value, a concept that 
has long been studied under topics such as informal organization, trust, culture, 
social support, social exchange, social resources, embeddedness, relational 
contracts, social networks, and interfirm networks.  Although the concept of social 
capital is relatively new in academic literature, it helps to unite these different 
topics under one joint category.  The political theorist Robert Putnam (2001) 
reported that the term has been rather ambiguous as it has been invented and 
used in the twentieth century by at least six different people at separate times and 
from separate disciplines.  However, it wasn’t until the 1980’s that sociologist 
James S. Coleman first established the term in intellectual discourse.  In his 
research into the social context of education, Coleman (1988) argues that social 
capital is both social and economic in nature.  It is aligned closely to economic 
concepts, such as physical and human capital because at its core, the theory 
helps to facilitate productivity; although, according to Coleman (1988) the theory is 
quite different from physical and human capital because it is more concerned with 
the structural changes in the intangible relations between individuals that help to 
facilitate action.  In other words, he argues that social capital exists in the social 
relations between people and it persists because of structure in the social context.  
Critics of social capital have argued that in shepherding these other topics under 
one umbrella, the idea helps to create something that means "many things to 
many people" (Narayan and Pritchett, 1997) and some have even called it an 
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"elastic term" (Lappe and DuBois, 1997: 119), meaning that its definition can flex 
or extend to fit a wide spectrum of uses.  Putnam (2001) challenged these 
critiques by further solidifying the theory with a more straightforward definition that 
focused more on relationships and less on structure.  He defines social capital as 
the “connections among individuals - social networks and the norms of reciprocity 
and trustworthiness that arise from them” (p. 19).  To illustrate this definition, 
Putnam reports that his interest in social capital arose from research into the lack 
of civic engagement in American cities.  He believes Americans, on the whole, 
have decreasing levels of social capital because they have traded being involved 
in their communities for the isolation of watching their own TV.
Despite low levels of social capital, relationships are still possible where there is 
some level of trust established between parties (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998).  Trust is 
a governing mechanism that acts as an attribute of the relationship between two 
individuals (Dibben, 2000).  It tends to serve as both a precursor and outcome of 
successful relationships as modeled through collective action (Leana and Van 
Buren, 1999).  Definitions of trust vary, but most researchers tend to agree that 
trust is expressed as one’s willingness to be vulnerable, such as sharing 
specialised knowledge with someone else (e.g. Rousseau et al., 1998).  
Relationships tend to influence economic exchanges, and the level of trust and 
familiarity between economic agents effects the level of sophistication of these 
relationships (i.e. Dibben, 2000).
There are a variety of methods by which to view an organization’s and an 
individual’s level of social capital.  Boschma’s (2006) five types of proximity 
present a unique lens to gauge an actor’s level of social capital and to develop 
strategies to improve their amount of social capital.  Boschma (2006) argues that 
particular types and levels of proximity must be in place if two parties are to learn 
from one another.  Too much or too little proximity can limit the exchange of 
knowledge.  Boschma (2006) discusses five points of proximity: cognitive, 
organizational, social, institutional, and geographical.  Each form has its benefits 
and limits.  Whereas Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) argued for three points of 
proximity that help to facilitate the creation of intellectual capital, Boschma (2006) 
argues that knowledge acquisition and innovation result from balanced levels of 
five points of proximity.
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Social capital is not only reserved for established organizations, but it is also a tool 
that can vitally help start-ups.  Researchers have found that social capital can help 
facilitate knowledge transfer and product innovation (e.g. Gabbay and Zuckerman, 
1998; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998).  However, the benefits of social capital are not 
only reserved for established organizations but for start-ups as well.  For example, 
Fafchamps and Minten (1999) argue that since network capital is crucial for firm 
growth, entrepreneurs must accumulate it the same way they gather physical 
resources.  In other words, social capital is a key resource in successful 
entrepreneurship and it must be cultivated in order for knowledge to be transferred 
between actors.  In a similar way, Putnam (2000) argues that social capital must 
be in place from the start.  Using bowling leagues as his main example, he argues 
that bowling leagues are not formed as a result of economic prosperity, but it is 
rather by way of economic prosperity that bowling leagues exist.
2.4 Social Capital and Business Incubation
Cohen and Fields (1999) argued that social capital must be understood in its 
particular context.  For example, they used the theory to understand Silicon 
Valley’s economic success and the importance of the local institutions and entities 
which help connect the variety of different actors.  The authors also found that 
social capital is often operationalized through networks and network relationships.  
Firm-level strategic alliances have long allowed organizations to tap into 
resources, (human, financial, etc.) to which they do not otherwise have access.  
Alliances between companies continue to grow and with this has erupted a 
plethora of research to examine the phenomenon.  Although start-ups typically 
enter an incubator as an infant business, the relationship between themselves and 
the incubator have close similarities to strategic alliances.  For entrepreneurs, 
these new networks help provide an opportunity to identify, collect, and allocate 
particular resources (e.g. Uzzi, 1999).  However, without an understanding of the 
network structure and the different relationships within that structure, social capital 
levels alone would be an inadequate measure to illustrate knowledge transfer.
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Networks are key for entrepreneurship and social capital because it helps to set 
the stage for actors to transfer knowledge between one another (Casson and 
Giusta, 2007).  According to Casson and Giusta (2007), networks, along with 
social capital, help to be the base where actors are able to connect and then share 
knowledge.  Coleman (1988) alternatively believed that social capital was a by-
product of organizational activities rather than from individual or network 
connections.  In the context of entrepreneurship, Fafchamps and Minten (1999) do 
not see developed networks as a by-product of entrepreneurship but instead find 
that successful entrepreneurs invest in relationships.  In other words, 
entrepreneurs are the type of people that invest in relationships because they see 
the value and then act accordingly.  Researchers also find that social capital acts 
as a prerequisite for new ventures.  Anderson and Jack (2002) in particular find 
that social capital can be the bridge that helps to connect the entrepreneur with the 
knowledge they need to succeed.  The data is inconclusive as to which comes 
first, entrepreneurship or networks or social capital.  However, as Anderson and 
Jack (2002) and Fafchamps and Minten (1999) argue, at least some level of social 
capital and some level of established networks must exist in order for 
entrepreneurs to both start a venture and to succeed in it.
Socio-economic  research shows that economic actions may be influenced by the 
social structure of ties within which actors are embedded (e.g. Granovetter, 1985).  
However, the structure in which information is disseminated and the ways in which 
strategic alliances help entrepreneurs to receive and exploit this information is 
relatively unknown.  Researchers have sought to construct dyads of an 
entrepreneurs network to show who is in their network and the levels in which the 
different actors contribute to the success of the start-up venture (e.g. Rice, 2002; 
Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001).  Although research is inconclusive as to both the 
network itself and also the influential relationships within, Gulati (1998) helps 
provide some clarity on the matter by way of investigating the social networks in 
strategic alliances.  What he finds is that managers can benefit from recognizing 
and learning to understand the evolution and performance of their own strategic 
alliances through both dyadic and network perspectives, not just one or the other.  
He also finds that the firms with more social capital are both more likely to have 
access to a larger number of alliances are able to attract better partners who want 
to associate with them.  This research is relevant to entrepreneurship and 
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incubation, particularly since this relationship implies some level of strategic 
alliance.  In other words, incubation involves two organizations who have come 
together to source some amount of mutual benefit, even in the earliest stages of 
entrepreneurship.
The dyadic perspective helps to identify the key players in a network.  They should 
not be viewed solely as dyadic though since many of the actors involved are 
communicating across network ties - so much so that networks must be viewed as 
active with ties of communication happening between the different parties.  In the 
incubator’s network, they typically have three primary categories of stakeholders 
who, in addition to the dyad of the entrepreneur and incubator manager, are 
influential in their activities.  These are: investors, key people, and the public.  An 
entrepreneur is then connected with the incubator through a strategic alliance 
(Figure 1 - Incubator Network).  From the start-up’s perspective, their network 
includes similar types of individuals (Figure 2 - Start-up Network); although, even if 
the categories or types of people are similar for an incubator, the particular 
individuals fulfiling those position descriptors may be different.
Figure 1 - Incubator Network$ ! ! Figure 2 - Start-up Network
In sum, research tends to indicate that business incubators can play a vital role in 
connecting entrepreneurs with the knowledge they need to succeed, particularly 
by helping to raise levels of social capital by plugging them into valuable networks.  
Although research points to incubation’s participation in this regard, there is limited 
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empirical research to help illustrate the ways in which the social context contribute 
to success in incubation.  In other words, research is inconclusive not only as to 
how incubators help entrepreneurs acquire knowledge but also regarding the 
levels at which these relationships contribute to successful entrepreneurship.  The 
following study attempts to address this gap in the research.  The methodology for 
the study will be outlined in the following section.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The methodology for this thesis is presented in two main parts.  The first section 
includes an overview of the methodology used in this study, along with the 
methodology relating to the historical context section.  The historical context has 
been produced from a handful of secondary sources and is presented here to 
show the history and current conditions of the New Zealand incubation system.  
The second part of the chapter explains the methodology of the primary research, 
much of which was influenced or based upon details raised in the historical context 
section.  This part will include the research questions in which the primary 
research is rooted, the attributes of the sample group from which the data was 
collected, an explanation of the method of data collection, the approach to data 
analysis, and finally the limitations of this study.
3.2 Methodology
In their review of business incubation literature, Hackett and Dilts (2004) found that 
a large portion of the research in this space had been published through economic 
development-focused journals such as: Economic Development Quarterly and the 
Economic Development Review.  Although it was not until the 1980s that research 
into business incubation began to take place, early on researchers tended to use a 
mix-method approach where mainly quantitative data collection was used to meet 
their research objectives.  In one of the larger reported incubator studies, Hackett 
and Dilts (2008) undertook a non-experimental cross-sectional survey.  A similar 
methodology was also constructed for Abduh’s et al. (2007) study of incubation 
from a tenant’s perspective, however this study differed in that its sample included 
current incubatees rather than incubator managers, which was the target for the 
Hackett and Dilts (2008) study.  Kilcrease’s (2011) assessment of the participating 
tenant’s experience in business incubation resembles Abduh’s et al. (2007) 
methodology as it is a national study, conducted in a variety of incubators; 
however, whereas the surveys by Abduh et al. (2007) go to a wide range of 
business incubators, Kilcrease (2011) takes a more localized perspective where 
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she compares tenants of similar industries who are enrolled in similar types of 
incubators. 
Over the years, there have also been several qualitative studies on business 
incubation.  For example, Rothschild and Darr’s (2005) study of Israeli incubation 
system was based on 49 in-depth interviews with incubator personnel, including 
the managers, workers, and incubator staff. Sa and Lee’s (2012) analysis of the 
relationships and networks in business incubation carried out 29 in-depth phone 
interviews with the incubator tenants of one Canada-based incubator.  The study 
also used secondary research sources like documentation in order to further 
understand the different relationships within business incubation.  Lichtenstein 
(1992) followed a similar approach but only engaged a limited number of 
incubators (2).  His mixed method approach included focus groups, in-depth 
interviews with the CEO managers and current tenants, and some ethnographic 
work.  Hansen et al.‘s (2000) Network Incubator study used a mixed-method 
approach that included a large quantitative survey that was issued to incubator 
tenants worldwide, followed by a large in-depth qualitative phone interview with 
incubator executives.  There is, however, some uncertainty as to what type of 
executive was interviewed, as it is not reported whether it is the CEO or someone 
else.
As introduced above, much of the previous research on business incubation takes 
a quantitative approach, which usually resulted in large-scale, country-wide or 
world-wide studies (e.g. Hansen et al., 2000; Kilcrease, 2011; Abduh et al., 2007; 
and Hackett and Dilts, 2008).  As is typical with large-scale quantitative 
approaches, the researcher ensures they are generating sufficient sample sizes, 
but in doing this, certain firms or participants could be included who might be 
otherwise omitted if a more structured selection process was implemented (e.g. 
Hindle, 2004).  Furthermore, the difficulty in comparing data from participants and 
practitioners of dissimilar incubators can distract from forming clear conclusions as 
to which incubator resources help the tenant’s businesses.
On the other hand, there is a stream of business researchers who are recognising 
the value of qualitative research as an approach to entrepreneur and incubation 
research.  Historically, entrepreneurship research has swayed toward quantitative 
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studies that are based on structured surveys that are more descriptive in nature 
than qualitative studies.  But with researchers finding that entrepreneurship is 
much more of an applied science than a ‘pure’ science, recent studies have called 
for a greater use of the qualitative method in studies of this topic (e.g. Hindle, 
2004).  Although research continues to identify trends quantitatively in the 
entrepreneurial experience, the act of starting a new business exists in a constant 
state of flux, hindered and fuelled by current market conditions.  Since this is the 
case, one would suspect that there would be an influx in qualitative research since 
it is often emergent in nature, where the research question is given the freedom to 
evolve with the information gathered from a study’s data.  This flexibility allows the 
researcher to identify and then respond to growing knowledge in a field (e.g. 
Eisenhardt, 1989).  However, the opposite has occurred and qualitative studies in 
entrepreneurship are greatly underrepresented in comparison to quantitative 
research (Hindle, 2004).  
The thesis presented here builds on some of this previous research, but it also 
distinctly differentiates itself methodologically from quantitative research because 
of its qualitative approach.  Qualitative research was chosen here because of its 
usefullness for conducting exploratory research that’s aimed at theory 
development, rather than theory confirming.  Additionally, the New Zealand 
incubation industry is limited in size - containing eight total incubators, each having 
a relatively small number of employees as well as incubating entrepreneurs.  With 
this being the case, this study was confined to a limited sample size.  However, by 
doing interviews you tend to get more nuanced data than by simply surveying the 
participants.  In other words, this study is focused on the interaction that takes 
place on behalf of both the interviewee and the interviewer, which can allow the 
interviewer to access aspects of an interviewees reality that would have been 
inaccessible, such as their subjective experiences and attitudes (Peräkylä, 2005).  
Although there are a variety of interview styles, a semi-structured interview was 
chosen because of the exploratory nature of this thesis.  This style provides a 
broad subject coverage in which the researcher is free to expand and explore 
further themes or comments that arise in conversations (O’Leary, 2009).  In sum, 
this data collection methodology allowed the participant’s perspectives and 
opinions to be investigated in more depth and flexibility than possible with a 
quantitative survey.
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3.3 Methodology for Historical Context
Before further discussing the primary research methods of this thesis, it is 
necessary to further understand the historical context of business incubation in 
New Zealand.  An understanding of the industry and its historical context will help 
to make clear why certain participants were chosen for this study.  Hindle (2004), 
for example, argues that selection cannot be divorced from the social and 
philosophical context.  With this in mind, the following historical context will draw 
on a handful of secondary resources to gain an understanding of the evoloution of 
the business incubation system in New Zealand.
The secondary data has been obtained from several secondary sources including:
$
Internet searches.  Google was the primary search engine used.  To stay 
current on present industry changes, several Google Alerts were setup.  The 
alerts typically provided up-to-date news from Global News sources, such as 
AP, as well as local New Zealand news outlets like The New Zealand Herald 
and The Dominion Post.
Government reports.  New Zealand government reports supplied details into 
the history and present state of the country’s incubation industry.  The reports 
were acquired from professional contacts within the Ministry of Economic 
Development (MED) and New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE).  These 
contacts were established by one of two ways: a recommendation from one 
of the study’s participants, or arbitrarily at industry-related conferences or 
events.
Industry-related websites.  The websites of individual incubators, government 
agencies, and the industry’s association site provided details as to the 
number of incubators, age, location, and other relevant details.
These sources have been used to assemble a historical context for incubation.  
The context helps to set the stage of the industry, from its inception to its current 
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state.  A focus on New Zealand’s history as a country will also be included 
because it helps to demonstrate both past and present need for incubation and 
other innovation catalysts.  These historical points will cover relevant government 
decisions, key trends, and changes to the incubator industry.
3.4 Historical Context
As one might expect, the current incubation system in New Zealand has evolved 
over the course of its ten-year life.  Its most recent configuration has attracted 
worldwide attention, with two of the incubators receiving worldwide recognition by 
Forbes and the North American Business Incubator Association (NBIA).  But, in 
order to understand the incubation system in New Zealand, one must go further 
back to get a sense of the country’s economic history.
From the first English settlers in the 18th century, New Zealand’s economy has 
been built on the back of commodities, primarily farming.  Until England joined the 
European Union (EU) in 1973, the bulk of the country’s GDP left the country as 
exports to the motherland.  In the 1980‘s New Zealand suffered a second major 
dip as a result of regulatory changes including the deregulation of the 
transportation industries and the growing openness to importing foreign made 
products.  These two changes helped contribute to the country’s current economic 
situation and led to its fall from the top half of the OECD in per capita GDP, to the 
bottom half (Table 1 - OECD GDP Per Head Rankings: 1970 and 2010).  Since 
these two major shifts, New Zealand has grown, but it has yet to regain its place at 
the top half of the OECD in per capita GDP (OECD, 2011).  Nonetheless, the 
country continues to be recognised worldwide for its contribution to a range of 
industries including manufacturing, tourism, and the creative industries. 
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Table 1 - OECD GDP Per Head Rankings: 1970 and 2010
1970 GDP Per Head* 2010 GDP Per Head*
Rank Country Rank Country
1 Switzerland 1 Luxembourg
2 Luxembourg 2 Norway
3 United States 3 Switzerland
4 Sweden 4 Australia
8 New Zealand 18 United Kingdom
9 Netherlands 19 Italy
10 Belgium 20 New Zealand
11 Germany 21 Spain
24 Mexico 33 Turkey
25 Turkey 34 Mexico
* GDP Per Head Rankings by Purchasing Power Parity based on Current 
Currency Rates (OECD, 1971; OECD, 2011)
Since the 1980s, the country has grown to regain some of its economic footing in 
the OECD, but it still trails neighbouring Australia and comparable countries such 
as Finland in annual economic growth.  Economic growth can come from a variety 
of sources, including entrepreneurship.  New Zealanders are never short on good 
ideas (and for that matter, entrepreneurs), and measures of entrepreneurship 
report that New Zealand’s lack of high-growth start-ups is not necessarily due to 
the lack of good entrepreneurial ideas (MED, 2009).  Difficulties arise, however, in 
commercializing the ideas by developing them into new ventures that contribute to 
economic development.  This is illustrated by the sheer number of start-up firms in 
New Zealand compared with their lackluster performance (e.g. Kelley et al., 2011).  
Ideas are being developed, but for some reason they struggle to develop into 
ventures that grow .  New Zealand’s government leaders have taken notice of 
these developments and have put together several initiatives in an attempt to 
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propel the economy forward at a faster rate.  A growing cohort of New Zealand 
government leaders believe that economic growth is directly connected to 
equipping high-growth start-ups with the tools and resources for realizing their 
potential (MED, 2011).  The primary initiative in this space is business incubation.
At the turn of the century, New Zealand rolled out its new incubation system.  The 
central government-funded Incubator Support Programmeme (ISP) was 
assembled by New Zealand’s Ministry of Economic Development (MED) and 
launched in June 2001.  Today, the programmeme’s oversight is provided by New 
Zealand Trade and Enterprise, the governmental department responsible for 
recruiting offshore businesses and helping domestic businesses expand abroad.  
At the time of the ISP was formed, New Zealand had four incubators.  Soon after 
that, the number grew to 17 and eventually reached 19.  By 2012, however, the 
number of incubators reduced to eight, which are located in New Zealand’s six 
largest metropolitan areas (NZTE, 2011b).  See Figure 3 to see the logos of the 
current New Zealand incubators.  In the time since the ISP began, several of the 
individual incubators have been recognised worldwide.  ICEHOUSE in Auckland 
was voted one of the top ten incubators in the world by Forbes in 2010 (Adams, 
2010), and in 2011, PowerHouse in Christchurch was recognised with the 
Incubator Innovation Award by the largest industry body, the National Business 
Incubator Association (NBIA) (“Success Stories - NBIA,” 2011).  The New 
Zealand’s government policy toward incubation is to “catalyze” rather than 
“support-in-perpetuity” the aspects of the innovation system, a system that 
includes business incubation.  The idea of incubators as self-sustaining entities is 
a rather new concept for the worldwide industry.  Most governments who run 
national incubator systems provide the majority of the operational resources for 
these incubators to survive and many have no intention of changing their model.  
For example, seventy-five percent of the incubators in the United States are not 
self-sustaining, but are non-for-profits – this from the US, the country who birthed 
the concept of business incubation and for years has led a strong innovation 
system marked by strong institutional frameworks, thriving early-stage capital 
market, and a healthy entrepreneurial class (Wiggins and Gibson, 2003).  In 
Europe, several governments consider incubator spending a necessary public 
investment (e.g. Frenkel et al., 2008).  Germany, for example, sees incubators as 
a tool for job creation.  France, on the other hand, uses incubators primarily to 
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improve the commercialization of university research.  Italy has used their 
incubation system in part to promote economic development in some of their 
outlying regions.  In Israel, a country widely thought to have the most successful 
system in terms of company output, began incubating to help incorporate new 
highly skilled immigrants into the country’s economy.  In comparison, the New 
Zealand government states that their incubation system has been established to 
“enhance the success of early-stage entrepreneurial companies and speed the 
establishment of self-sustaining companies” (MED, 2008). Incubators in New 
Zealand have diversified their sources of funding; however,the industry taken as a 
whole has not yet actualized the governments goal of “catalyzing” rather than 
“supporting-in-perpetuity” the country’s innovation system (Lane, 2009).  Although 
the New Zealand incubation system is yet to achieve sustainability, from an 
economic development point of view, the incubator system’s return on investment 
(ROI) continues to improve.  Yee (2009), for example, reported that the current 
ROI is $47:$1.  In other words, the total economic impact from incubated 
businesses is currently reported as higher in comparison to the cost of incubating.
Figure 3 - Industry Logos
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Chapter 4: Method Primary Research
This section describes the research methods used for this thesis.  Drawing on the 
historical context, the following section will further address the research questions, 
as well as define the methodological approach for the primary research.
4.1 Research Questions
This study seeks to address a number of questions via semi-structured interviews:
What is the role of relationships in incubated entrepreneurship?
Through open-ended questions, the role of relationships in the process of 
starting a business is revealed.  Each participant deems certain relationships 
to be more important or influential for their own venture than others.
$
What is the role of relationships in business incubation?
This question will build on the previous question by exploring the 
relationships in business incubation, both from the perspective of the 
entrepreneur and of the incubator personnel.
Are business incubators supporting entrepreneurs in New Zealand?
Exploring this question from an entrepreneur’s and incubator manager’s 
perspectives will help to provide awareness for certain issues or benefits 
related to the effect of business incubators.
4.2 Data Required
After considering available data collection approaches for this project, a series of 
semi-structured interviews were selected as the most appropriate research design 
for understanding the perceptions of New Zealand entrepreneurs and incubators 
on this topic.  This method allowed for a great deal of flexibility in its 
implementation.  
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Although this research started with a series of open-ended questions, the interview 
developed into a conversation, creating a natural flow of dialogue between the 
interviewer and interviewee.  As a result, this method helped to establish trust 
during the interview and opened up doors for a deeper investigation of particular 
themes raised by the interviewee.  In each case this method helped to draw out 
beliefs and opinions around different issues that had not been previously planned 
for discussion.  As this was the case, the data collected was then grouped into 
themes by the researcher.  Prompting was avoided in terms of asking about 
specific relationships, such as the entrepreneurs relationship with the incubator 
CEO.
By providing open-ended questions, interviewees were able to reflect on and talk 
about their incubation and entrepreneurial experience, particularly how 
relationships helped in their pursuits of either starting a new business or helping 
entrepreneurs get started.  Additionally, previous research into incubator literature 
and the industry’s historcal context carried out prior to the interview allowed the 
researcher to prompt the interviewee with certain open-ended questions.  For 
example, this could include questions related to the incubator’s history.
4.3 Participants
Current research on business incubation has typically sought to investigate 
business incubation from the viewpoint of practitioners and current entrepreneurs.  
This study brings in a third sample set of the graduate incubatees.  Taken together, 
the addition of graduate incubatees help to reveal additional aspects of business 
incubation that current users or practitioners overlooked.  At the start of this study, 
it was suspected that because graduate incubatees had been removed from the 
incubator, they would be better able to critically reflect on their incubation 
experience.  Generally, this hypothesis proved to be true.  Graduates typically 
spoke more candidly about their time in the incubator.  For many incubator 
graduates, this study was the first time they had spoken at length to anyone about 
their time in incubation.  For some graduates, the interview took on a cathartic 
experience, whereby they were able to reflect on and talk through their experience 
with someone who generally understood incubation and could sympathize, and in 
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some cases empathize, with the participants.  Some of the richest data came from 
these incubator graduate conversations.  Though there were several particularly 
excellent interviews with practitioners and current entrepreneurs, they were, on the 
whole, much more guarded and hesitant to discuss the more critical aspects of 
incubation.  Nevertheless, the methodology of interviewing these three groups 
helped to create a well-rounded perspective on incubation.  
On the whole, business incubation research focuses in on technology incubators 
which exist to help quickly grow technology start-ups.  Although each of the 
participating incubators in New Zealand are primarily focused on incubating 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) companies, they are not 
confined solely to that sector.  Instead, New Zealand incubators serve a variety of 
start-ups from different industries, assuming these start-ups have high-growth and 
exporting potential.  Amongst this study’s sampling of incubating entrepreneurs 
and incubator graduates, there was only three whose company’s would not be 
considered ICT.  A handful of the incubators have more of a focus on particular 
industries depending on what are the key industries in their region or city.  To this 
end, this thesis will not solely include technology incubators, but will instead 
classify the participating incubators simply as business incubators.
4.4 Sample
The sampling was purposefully selected in order to ensure the interviewees in the 
sample were comparable (O'Leary, 2009).  This required the sample group to be in 
a similar strategic environment, which was achieved by choosing participants that 
were in similar positions in the incubator support staff and entrepreneurs who were 
in similar stages within their start-up process.  Four primary guidelines were used 
to qualify participants.
1. Each of the four selected incubators are part of New Zealand’s government-
backed incubator system.
2. Incubating entrepreneurs were comparable across the four different incubators.  
First, one of the incubating entrepreneurs was on the front end of incubation.  
They had recently entered the incubator and had typically been in the incubator 
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less than a year.  Second, an incubating entrepreneur who had been in the 
incubator for some time and was nearing the time for graduation from the 
incubator was selected.  Each of the incubator CEOs graciously recommended 
these two incubating entrepreneurs to this study.
3. Two past incubatees were selected from each incubator.  These entrepreneurs 
left the incubator at some point in their start-up process, either because they 
graduated the incubator or because their business failed, and they were forced 
to leave.
4. At each of the four incubators, two incubator employees were selected, one was 
the CEO and the second participant either fulfiled the role of incubator manager 
or incubator strategist.
Based on these criteria, a total of twenty-five participants were recruited from four 
incubators in New Zealand.  The sample included incubating entrepreneurs who 
are currently enrolled in a New Zealand incubator (28%), incubating entrepreneurs 
(40%) who were previous incubator tenants but they have either graduated or left 
an incubator, and incubator staff (32%) who in this study included the CEO and 
one incubator manager or key strategist at each of the four studied incubators.  
Table 2 lists the participants by incubator, name, and position.  Additionally a 
typology is included here for a quick reference back from the findings and 
discussion chapters.
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Table 2 - Study Participants
Incubator Position Name Typology
Incubator 1
Incubated Entrepreneur (A)
Frasier Claire
1AKatie Whitney
Trevor Karrie 
Incubating Entrepreneur (B) Sam Zak 1B
Incubator CEO (C) Jared 1C
Incubator Strategist (D) Jeff 1D
Incubator 2
Incubated Entrepreneur (A) Ben 2A
Incubating Entrepreneur (B) Susan Stephen 2B
Incubator CEO (C) Luke 2C
Incubator Strategist (D) Sarah 2D
Incubator 3
Incubated Entrepreneur (A) Caleb Mark 3A
Incubating Entrepreneur (B) Bobby 3B
Incubator CEO (C) Matt 3C
Incubator Manager (D) Jessica 3D
Incubator 4
Incubated Entrepreneur (A) Patrick 4A
Incubating Entrepreneur (B) Zoe Nate 4B
Incubator CEO (C) David 4C
Incubator Manager (D) Rachel 4D
The four participating incubators were chosen at random.  There are currently 
eight incubators in New Zealand who are government-backed.  By way of 
recommendations, this study was connected to CEOs, support staff, and 
entrepreneurs associated with four of the eight incubators.  The method of 
identification and recruiting the incubators and their participants utilized both 
handpicked and snowball sampling.  Support staff from each of the four 
participating incubators were met at an industry conference in Auckland in 
December 2011.  From these meetings, relationships were developed with three of 
the four participating incubator CEOs.  After a series of emails with the CEOs in 
January 2012, interviews were scheduled with them, one of their key support staff, 
and two current incubatees.  The process of connecting with graduate 
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entrepreneurs was different.  Since many of these graduates are now out on their 
own and are no longer closely associated with the incubator, they had to be 
accessed through other means.  In most cases, the process of sourcing these 
participants followed a snowball sampling approach. Usually either a participant or 
someone familiar with this study recommended them.
Although the study’s participants were either entrepreneurs or incubator 
employees, the participants in the interviews often suggested a third category of 
individuals who were involved in incubation.  This third category, which will be 
classified as stakeholders, includes three sets of individuals: investors, key people, 
and the wider public.  Each stakeholder has differing influence on the start-up or 
incubator.  Figure 4 helps to illustrate the dyadic connections between the 
entrepreneurial stakeholders, the entrepreneurs themselves, incubators, and 
incubator stakeholders.
Figure 4 - Stakeholder Diagram
4.5 Data Collection
Preliminary interviews were carried out in September and October of 2011 and the 
majority of the interviews took place from January to March 2012.  Once the 
participants agreed to take part, interviews were scheduled.  Although the 
participants were geographically dispersed throughout the cities in North and 
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South Islands of New Zealand, each of the interviews were carried out one-on-one 
and face-to-face.  The locations for the interviews typically took place within the 
office space of the incubator, the office of an incubator graduate, or a public 
location such as a local cafe.  In every case but one, the interview was recorded 
and later transcribed.
Before the interviews, each of the participants were presented with an information 
sheet (Appendix A: Information Sheet).  The information sheet broadly overviewed 
the study as well as explained the confidential nature of the interview, and their 
rights.  The broad overview titled: “An assessment of relationships and business 
incubation in New Zealand” aided participation and ensured the interviews covered 
certain aspects of incubation.  A prepared consent form (Appendix B: Consent 
Form) was presented after each interview for them to sign.  This further outlined 
their rights, the confidentiality of the study, and also provided them an opportunity 
to choose their pseudonym used in the study.  Most pseudonym’s ended up being 
chosen at random as several of the participants declined to assign themselves a 
false name.
Interviews ranged in length from approximately half an hour to an hour and a half.  
The average length of an interview was around 46 minutes.
4.6 Data Analysis
After most interviews, the transcription process began immediately.  This helped to 
decrease the time between research and analysis, while also helping to strengthen 
the researcher’s questionnaire by reworking for the next interviews the wording of 
some questions which might have originally been difficult for the participants to 
understand.
Once the transcriptions were completed and checked for consistency, common 
themes between transcripts were identified.  Content analysis was the primary 
strategy used to evaluate the findings of this research and was selected because it 
provided an opportunity to run a thematic analysis with coding (e.g. O’Leary, 
2009).  Following this strategy, after each interview, the data obtained was 
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analysed, line-by-line, exploring words, concepts, and linguistic devices.  The 
themes that resulted from this analysis not only both confirmed and refuted various 
themes in the literature but also resulted in the development of new themes.   After 
each transcript was individually coded, the corresponding quotes were compiled 
from the different transcripts into one document.  Of the themes assembled into 
the one document, three particular thematic categories rose to the surface.  These 
categories have been defined as tensions and include:
1. Advisory Tensions
2. Financial Tensions
3. Ethotic Tensions
These three themes will be discussed in greater detail in the Findings chapter of 
this thesis.
4.7 Limitations
There have been a handful of limitations associated with this study.  Four 
limitations will be discussed here.  The first relates to the sample size.  As 
discussed above, the target sample size for each incubator was six participants.  
These six include two incubator personnel, two incubating entrepreneurs, and two 
incubated entrepreneurs.  This target sample was mostly met at each of the 
incubators except for three, where one participant was not available to be 
interviewed in the timeframe for which the study took place.  One of the 
participating incubators, however, exceeded expectations with an additional four 
incubator graduate participants.  These developments produced a total sample 
size of 25 participants.  Although an even sampling across the four incubators 
would have been preferred, the researcher believes the new sample size to have 
no limiting effect on the exploratory conclusions drawn here.  Furthermore, with 
the sampling slightly skewed toward incubator graduates, the researcher suspects 
that the study is more reflective of the incubator space.  As mentioned previously, 
the incubator graduates on a whole spoke openly and in some cases, especially 
candidly about their experience in incubation.
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With a portion of the sample including entrepreneurs who are not currently 
enrolled in an incubator, the interviews forced these participants to reflect back to 
their past experiences in the incubator.  For some, the time since their departure 
from the incubator had been a period of several years. Literature has shown some 
limitations and benefits related to how participants retrospectively recast their past 
experiences (e.g. Wolfram Cox and Hassard, 2007).  To address this limitation, 
this research incorporated strategies to help participants accurately recall their 
past experiences.  The main strategy was to provide the participants with the 
information sheet over email before their interview took place.  This allowed them 
to get a sense of the direction of the research so they could reflect on their 
experiences beforehand.
A third limitation is that some of the participants may have altered their responses 
to place themselves in a more positive or negative light.  To address this, the 
researcher ensured that the information sheet and other prior communication with 
the interviewee before the interview helped to reinforce that the study was solely 
focused on hearing their perspective rather than trying to extract out preconceived 
answers from the participants.  Although the researcher does not believe this 
limitation was a major issue for this research, he found that some participants who 
were either currently incubating or were employed by the incubator were guarded 
in their answers to the questions.  In other words, the incubated entrepreneurs 
tended to communicate their entrepreneurial and incubation experience openly 
and in detail whereas participants on the incubator side, such as CEOs or 
incubator managers often were more guarded and reserved.  This was not always 
the case, but there was a general sense that the entrepreneurs had less to lose in 
sharing their story than incubator employees or incubating entrepreneurs.  The 
data is inconclusive as to why this was the case, although collecting data from 
entrepreneurs helped to provide a consumer-sided perspective as well as reveal 
aspects of incubation that might have otherwise remained unsaid.  Interestingly, as 
the interview would progress in length, the interviewee usually provided answers 
that seemed to be more in line with their perspectives.  This might have been due 
to the trust that was developed over time between the interviewer and interviewee 
(e.g. Creswell and Miller, 2000).  Additionally, the researcher found many of the 
participants were very open and inviting and often stayed around to chat past the 
end of the interview.  These informal conversations were not recorded, but they did 
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lead the researcher to believe that the participants responses during the interview 
were a valid and accurate reflection of their perspective.
Additional limitations may result from the fact that a single researcher carried out 
this research.  Here, everything from the structure of the interviews and the 
presentation of the study to the interviewee to what questions are or are not asked 
has been determined solely by researcher.  The use of a question outline helped 
to ensure that each interview followed the same list of open-ended questions.  
However, the nature of the interview helped to determine if the interviewer asked 
the interviewee other questions additional to the questionnaire or if he should 
chose to drop some questions and not ask them.  The researcher helped to 
ensure that the interviewee communicated additional thoughts, outside of the 
research.  Ending each interview by asking if the participant had further comments 
helped the researcher to open a topic of dialogue that might have been previously 
unaddressed.  Answers to this final question often helped to further illustrate the 
interviewees answers to the previously asked questions.
Finally, because the researcher is not a native to New Zealand and who has spent 
the majority of their life outside of the New Zealand context, they may have been 
prone to mistakenly define words or comments from the interviewee.  If this were 
ever the case, a faulty definition could lead to a misunderstanding on the part of 
the researcher and lead him to mistakenly categorize an interviewee’s statement.  
Although it is worth noting this potential limitation, the researcher is confident that 
misunderstanding due to cultural differences did not take place.  The researcher 
attempted to overcome this potential complication by examining the patterns in the 
data in order to verify that certain themes were categorized accurately as well as 
discussed results with the supervisor, who is a native to New Zealand.
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Chapter 5: Findings
This thesis took the researcher to three cities, four incubators, and 13 companies.  
In total, 25 participants took part in in-depth conversations.  After each of the 
interviews, the researcher grew in intimacy with the findings through a rigorous 
transcription and thematic process.  Then, over conversations with the 
researcher’s supervisor and after a return to the literature, he began to identify 
corresponding responses from the participants.  Many of their responses 
concerned the different relational tensions affecting entrepreneurs in business 
incubation.  The following chapter will use these tensions to report the findings and 
illustrate the relationships between the entrepreneur and incubator and between 
their different stakeholders.  
Oxford University Dictionary defines the word tension as a relationship between 
ideas or qualities that is characterised by conflicting demands or implications 
(Oxford Dictionary, 2012).  In management literature, the concept of tension has 
been both used to explain intra- and inter-organisational relationships (e.g. 
Asakawa, 2001) in organisational identity literature (e.g. Fiol, 2002) and applied to 
a discursive perspective to understand collective identity (e.g. Hardy, Lawrence, 
and Grant, 2005).  In this final instance, tension helps to illustrate an ongoing 
interplay between individuals that helps to facilitate effective collaboration.  In 
other words, the concept of tension can be viewed as a healthy strain between 
actors of differing demands that is optimal, not when the tension is elevated or 
increased, but when it is maintained.  In this paper, the concept of tension will be 
used to describe the relational dynamics between different parties in 
entrepreneurship and incubation.  In this context, if a tension is well managed, 
then a relationship will be mutually beneficial to all parties involved.  A tension can 
either be offset by a surplus or a shortage.  In each case, the tension has either 
too little or too much.  Imbalance can then occur, forcing the involved parties to 
manage the surplus or shortage in order to help deliver the tension back to a 
healthy state.  Parties can impose tactics to help position the tension back to an 
aligned state.  In sum, a well-managed, healthy tension will result in favorable 
outcomes for the entrepreneur, incubator, and stakeholders.
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The study revealed that, among the participants, entrepreneurs who were either 
currently incubating or had graduated from an incubator dealt with similar 
stakeholder tensions.  Since this was often found to be the case, the thesis will 
group both sets of entrepreneurs into one category titled entrepreneurs.  This title 
will refer to participants as entrepreneurs, if they are currently incubating or have 
already incubated.
The data revealed three primary tensions in the different human relationships in 
entrepreneurship and incubation.  Each of the three tensions helps to illustrate a 
categorical issue that, if not balanced, the entrepreneur and incubator’s success 
(or potential for success) will be diminished.  First, tensions relating to advisory 
matters came up frequently in the data.  To better explore these advisory tensions, 
they are introduced here as either strategic tensions or operational tensions.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, operational tensions encompass any particular activity 
that involve running a business.  This could include how to deal with situations with 
employees, procedures in accounting, sales, or other common business activities. 
Strategic tensions, on the other hand, relate to the plans and policies of an 
organisation – the key decisions and plans that end up shaping an organisation.  
In fact, more than any of the other tensions, the data tended to show that issues 
relating to strategy substantially contributed to a start-up’s success or failure.   
However, various alignment tactics will be illustrated to help counteract a surplus 
or shortage of an advisory tension.  Second, the financial tension illustrates the 
need for entrepreneurs to ensure that their relationship with investors maintains a 
healthy balance.  Finally, tensions relating to an incubators ethos were repeatedly 
raised in the data.  However, a healthy ethotic tension may be unaligned when 
incubating entrepreneurs are overly independent or too dependent on their 
incubator.  In sum, the following section will report findings under the three 
categorical tensions of advisory, financial, and ethotic.
5.1 Advisory Tensions
The entrepreneurs interviewed for this study tended to emphasise the impact 
advisory support had on their venture, both positively and negatively.  Of all the 
different advice provided to entrepreneurs, the data tended to isolate two particular 
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types: strategic and operational.  In the below section, the findings concerning this 
tension will be reported.
5.1.1 Strategic Advisory Tensions
Those entrepreneurs who enter an incubator have identified that they cannot fulfil 
their start-up goals with their single expertise, but they need help from others who 
can provide knowledge in areas other than their own.  As Claire (1A), an incubated 
entrepreneur, discovered:
The whole thing with the incubator is that it’s a bunch of amazing people with 
really quite significant resources, who have put up their hand already, 
regardless of you, and say “we want to help the little guy who wants to help 
themselves.”  So by stepping in as the “little guy”, all of that goodness was 
made available to us.
For several start-ups, like Claire (1A)’s, there are valuable resources available 
from incubators.  Patrick (4A), an incubated entrepreneur, comments on the 
importance of the incubator help strategically:
The incubator provided a vehicle for getting out of the day-to-day and talking 
about my company’s bigger plan.  They also introduced me to some other 
people who I could do this big picture stuff with.
For an entrepreneur, good strategy can be the difference between creating a 
successful or failed company (e.g. Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005).  As Zoe (4B), an 
incubating entrepreneur discovered:
There’s such a bit difference between strategy and day-to-day management.  
Often, the management could be going alright, but if the strategy is wrong 
you’ve got a bigger problem long-term.  But, it could look all good at the time.
An entrepreneur’s venture strategy will also determine how long they will spend in 
the incubator, its life cycle, market targets, and other key configurative decisions.  
In most of the incubators, the entrepreneur is primarily looking to the incubator for 
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sound advice, particularly advice that lies outside of the entrepreneur’s area of 
expertise.  Zak (1B), an incubated entrepreneur, comments:
So one of the big things in the incubator is getting some advice that’s more 
strategic and not limited to my experience as an industrial designer.
Zak (1B) later discovered that the strategic input from the incubator and its 
stakeholders either positively or negatively affected his venture.  He commented:
Sometimes it turned out that it was a good suggestion and other times it 
wasn’t really constructive and it caused you to be a bit rash and pressured 
into doing something that you later regretted.
5.1.2 Operational Advisory Tensions
On the whole, incubators tend to be populated with first time entrepreneurs, many 
of whom have very little business experience.  Nate (4B), an incubating 
entrepreneur comments on his own experience:
I’ve come from almost a completely technical background and the incubator 
has really filled in the business gaps, and continue to do so now - particularly  
the role of CFO and COO.  They basically plug in the gaps where I don’t 
have the skills yet.  Hopefully those gaps are decreasing.
Like Nate (4B), an entrepreneur might be trained as a scientist or an engineer who 
ends up unintentionally inventing a new technology or discovering a new 
application for an existing technology whereby they are catapulted into forming a 
new business to bring their new invention to the marketplace (e.g. Callaghan, 
2008).  Their goal was not to be an entrepreneur per se, but in order for their 
technology to grow, the role of chief executive falls to them.  Though other new 
entrepreneurs might have some business skills, they could lack experience in 
important areas, for example, in hiring and managing a team or raising capital.  
Whatever the state of an entrepreneur’s operational experience, an incubator 
positions themselves to train and equip entrepreneurs so that they will be able to 
mend their inexperience quickly.  However, with multiple stakeholders who try to 
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participate in providing operational support to the entrepreneur, advisory tensions 
tend to arise. 
Operational support can be quite different from strategic support; however, both 
come from similar advisory sources.  The Oxford Dictionary defines operational as 
“readying for use” (Oxford Dictionary, 2012).  Applied to business, operational 
support can encompass all of the activities that ready a business to run efficiently 
and effectively.  This could include registering the business with the state, running 
an effective accounting system, and HR techniques for managing employees.  Jeff 
(1D), an incubator strategist remarks about the importance of operational support:
They (advisors) are someone to ring up in the middle of the day to say, I’ve 
just had a staff member shout at me and walk off.  What do I do now?
Many entrepreneurs start a business with very little or any operational background. 
One entrepreneur is of the opinion that there are certain people who have the 
potential, but their abilities need to be developed in order to run a successful 
venture.  Bobby (3B) remarks: 
There is a group of people, who could be good, but don’t have the skills to 
get there.  The ones that learn those skills are the ones that get there.
With a bit of education and experience, the limited operational knowledge can be 
mended as the entrepreneur develops into a successful businessperson.  
This study identified that as each entrepreneur moved deeper into starting their 
business, they began to confront new operational challenges.  These challenges 
could include new experiences like hiring and then managing employee number 
one, or figuring out how to file their first year of taxes.  Over the course of 
operating a start-up or an incubator, these operational milestones might be more 
challenging to confront without supportive advisors who can, in a sense, teach the 
entrepreneur how to manage different situations.  Nate (4B) remarks:
There’s a gap in our knowledge, cause we’re new at this.  The incubator 
brings in people to fill those gaps, or they fill the gaps themselves.
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But, if an entrepreneur fails to acquire the necessary knowledge to manoeuvre 
certain situations, than the start-up might inevitably loose progress and fail.  
Incubating entrepreneurs are caught in a stream of advisory currents that make 
recommendations from a variety of sources.  The entrepreneur must manage and 
find ways to combat the different advisory input. 
5.1.3 Alignment Tactics
With all of the potential benefits for a start-up that can stem from advice - both of 
the strategic and operational type - it can be disastrous when entrepreneurs either 
have a shortage or surplus of advice.  To address different types of misalignment, 
the data revealed a number of tactics that can help to readjust a surplus or 
shortage of advisory knowledge in order to ultimately protect the entrepreneur and 
incubator from failure.  The tactics to align a shortage by way of bridging the 
learning gap and to confront a surplus by way of filtering strategic advice will be 
reported here.
Aligning a Shortage of Advice
To confront a shortage of the advisory tension, entrepreneurs tend to source 
particular knowledge from within their pool of stakeholders.  In several cases, the 
entrepreneur reported looking to key people such as a mentor for advisory 
support, even if they did not have all the words to communicate what they needed.  
Research has shown that a mentor can, for example, be highly successful in 
helping to provide management advice and much needed confidence to an 
entrepreneur (Deakins et al., 1998).  Claire (1A) found that her particular mentor 
was able to draw out and help enable her to engage with abilities that she might 
have possessed, but she had not realised her potential until now.  She comments: 
He (my mentor) leads me to be the best person I can be and empowers me 
to believe in myself.  I’d trade pretty much anything to have that.
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However, as Bisk (2002) discovered in Ireland, most economic development 
agencies fail to supply advisors that effectively help the entrepreneurs, and an 
entrepreneur’s age and education play quite heavily in whether these advisors 
relationships are successful.  Jeff (1D) has similarly found that you cannot 
immediately match an entrepreneur with advisory support.  He remarks:
The incubator can never do it (pair an incubator with a mentor) straight away, 
because you don’t know enough about the person.  You don’t know how they 
react to advice, what kind of personality they need to interact, and whether 
that mentor is just purely on the human side or if it’s best that they had a bit 
of skill.
Although not all shortages of advisory tensions stem from a mentor and 
entrepreneur relationship, entrepreneurs tended to find other support in the 
incubator staff and other individuals through the incubator.  Trevor (1A), an 
incubated entrepreneur, discussed learning where to go to source particular kinds 
of support.  He comments:
I learned that those people and networks are out there and now I know 
where to go and where to look for them.
Now with an understanding of where he can source advisory support, Trevor (1A) 
is equipped to go out and find the knowledge he might need.  Reflecting back on 
past experience, Caleb (3A), an incubated entrepreneur, noticed that he still 
applies much of the operational knowledge he gained during his time in the 
incubator:
The incubator opened the way for how I thought and how I engaged with my 
company and engage with partners.
However, the other entrepreneurs revealed that their shortage of advisory support 
tended to breakdown when too much dissonance between the parties prevented 
the listener from understanding and then applying the advice given.  In some 
situations, there was a learning gap for either the advisor or advisee that 
prevented understanding from occurring between each party.  Although they might 
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communicate with one another and sense that they were understanding each 
other, there was a tendency for neither party to actually assimilate.  Karrie (1A), an 
incubated entrepreneur, commented:
There can’t just be clear communication, but there has to be understanding 
on the receiving side.
As entrepreneurs move through the incubator and learn, they tend to become 
better equipped to bridge the learning gap and communicate with individuals, even 
those who perhaps earlier on in the entrepreneurial journey, might have been quite 
difficult to understand.  As Katie (1A), an incubated entrepreneur alludes:
At some stages some people were just so difficult to work with, but then 
when the company was a different stage, those same people became 
valuable again.
As she discovered, the learning gap that once separated her from understanding 
certain guidance was mitigated over time as she progressed in the incubator.  
Despite all the advisory support available in business incubation, many are not 
able to carve through the knowledge gap that contributes to their failure to 
comprehend guidance.  Incubators can assist entrepreneurs in sourcing the 
appropriate advisory support, however, when they do not do this, the entrepreneur 
could be left with a shortage of guidance that eventually prevents them from 
receiving the information they need. Karrie (1A) comments:
You have to pickup a lot on your own, which I guess is what you’re supposed 
to do as an entrepreneur.  That’s not a problem, but I do think with more 
discipline and communication that things could work a lot more efficiently.
Some find that its not just miscommunication between the entrepreneur and 
strategist, but that there are other factors that confine an entrepreneur from 
connecting with input that is otherwise fruitful for their venture.  As Bobby (3B), an 
entrepreneur, explained, the solution can be as simple as asking:
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If you ask people, you’ll get it.  If you don’t, you don’t.
Other times the obstacle is the entrepreneur’s personality.  If they are closed off to 
learning and are not interested in input from others, then there is a problem.  
Frasier (1A), an incubated entrepreneur, pined the issue rather poignantly, stating:
As an entrepreneur, you have to have enough of an ego to believe you can 
actually make it (your start-up) happen.  You have to be kind of a strong 
person to be doing it.  It would be easy for entrepreneurs to be thought of as 
egotistical blowhards, which is why there are real benefits in having certain 
virtues or certain types of character traits as apart of your personality.  
Nobody wants to help the blowhard.
Frasier (1A) implies that boastful and egocentric entrepreneurs will receive less 
support, simply because of their personality or attitude.  Others have used the 
analogy of the incubator as a school to describe the ways in which an 
entrepreneur’s knowledge gap is addressed in incubation.  In a sense, the 
stakeholders maintain the role of teacher while entrepreneurs enroll as students.  
The different entrepreneurs or students may also learn from each other.  Those 
who know more about one subject could reach out to assist other students who 
might be struggling.  Incubation can be an insular collective where people with 
ideas come to be entrepreneurs and, in some cases, graduate as a CEO of a 
growing venture.  Zak (1B) remarks:
It’s kind of like school, it doesn’t feel quite as real.  You’re in this game where 
you’re doing this, sliding this, aiming for investment, and then this (your 
venture) is somehow now real.
Another entrepreneur commented on the learning she achieved from her 
stakeholders:
They were willing to develop me a little and teach me what I needed to know.
Entrepreneurs like Karrie (1A) understand that they can benefit greatly from 
receiving the right knowledge to top up their shortage of advisory support and that 
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they will be closer to leading their venture down a route to growth if they are willing 
and able to learn and grasp advisory input from others.
However, in several of the incubators studied, entrepreneurs disclosed that they 
would have been able to connect with more of the resources offered by their 
stakeholders had they been aware of these resources.  This also includes 
resources in the broader start-up ecosystem that are available by way of 
connections through the incubator.
People and organisations need to be really clear about what they’re good at 
and what they’re going to do and how that fits in with another organisation.  
Otherwise, resources just get wasted and people end up getting toes 
stepped on and getting offended and nothing gets done.
As Karrie (1A) points out, entrepreneurs and incubators will be better off with more 
defined roles and clearer connections with the available resources.  In other 
words, effective communication may help to align a shortage of advice by helping 
to overcome a learning gap and allow shortages to be overcome.  On the other 
hand, a surplus of advice can occur.  Tactics to align a surplus will be reported in 
the following section.
Aligning a Surplus of Advice
Entrepreneurs are often the recipients of an eclectic mix of advice from a variety of 
sources.  Even though learning gaps might be filled and are no longer much of an 
issue, entrepreneurs may still be prone to have trouble filtering the surplus of 
advice they receive.  Different mentors, investors, friends and family, incubator 
personnel, and others might provide an entrepreneur different advice on a single 
topic. Deciding which advice to act upon can be a daunting and nearly impossible 
task for many entrepreneurs, particularly individuals who are new to 
entrepreneurship and business in general.  Zoe (4B) framed the issue well, stating:
Everyone wants you to succeed, but maybe they don’t have the right way to 
look at something.  Some people will push you in one direction, which is 
actually wrong so something I’ve learned is highlighting that advice and 
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going: “hold on, that’s not really good advice.”  So it’s kind of working that 
out...
Zak (1B) found himself in a similar situation: 
I got pressured into looking way too far down, like going abroad and talking 
to big companies (potential distributors) before we had anything.
Zak (1B) has since put controls in place for himself to help filter input, but, it was 
only after the fact that he believed he got pressured into following a strategy he 
later regretted.  Although successful entrepreneurs will eventually learn to sort 
through differing perspectives in making decisions, early stage entrepreneurs 
might have difficulty deciphering.  He remarks:
You don’t get bullied per se, but you’ve got someone in their 50’s with a good 
track record, and you go: “a lot of it (advice) can be right, but he may not 
have much experience in this type of business,” so you’ve really got to keep 
on.
Incubators and entrepreneurs alike should know that trouble filtering strategic 
advice is common for new entrepreneurs.  However, for this first to be the case, an 
entrepreneur’s needs must be understood.  Entrepreneurs have a plethora of 
differing needs.  Researchers have sought to quantify an entrepreneur’s different 
needs in different stages through which entrepreneurs move in forming a new 
venture (e.g. Kaulio, 2003).  In other words, if the start-up process is a journey 
from conception to sustainable business, then there exist a variety of intermediate 
stages.  Research is inconclusive concerning the particular stages of 
entrepreneurship, possibly because there are a variety of external factors that 
contribute to the entrepreneur’s context (e.g. Manolova and Yan, 2002).  The 
interviewed entrepreneurs tended to identify that the incubators lacked a 
framework for understanding the different stages entrepreneurs moved through.  
Karrie (1A) commented:
I think to really get the incubation right, there has to be a really clear 
understanding of the networks and the infrastructures and how the flow 
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works - so understanding what is happening at a company at this stage and 
who do they need to access, how do they need to access and identify those 
steps and how we need to get them over those hurdles.
Likewise, Patrick (4A) remarked:
Watching incubation go on for so many years with so many companies, while 
I was a tenant in that building, there were a lot of good ideas that should 
have been put through some stages because it became evident that$ there’s 
a bit of a pathway - it’s not always linear.  That flow or that process of moving 
company’s to the next stage should have been stronger.  There were some 
company’s that suffered because the steps weren’t laid out for them or they 
weren’t pushed to take the next step.
To help move entrepreneurs beyond their current obstacle, particular individuals 
and other resources are needed.  Karrie (1A) remarks:
The most useful people in those situations were people who understood that 
you were in a start-up phase and who could apply their skills and gifts to that.
Karrie identifies two things. Entrepreneurs need help first of all from individuals 
who can understand where they are at and second, from those who can 
communicate specifically to them based on the stage they are in.  This implies that 
entrepreneurs require help that appertains to their particular situation.  Frasier (1A) 
illustrates this point further, commenting that the useful people are:
Anyone who knew what they were talking about and could translate those 
terms for start-ups.
Once an entrepreneurs’ needs are understood, Frasier (1A) argues that these 
needs can then be addressed using appropriate language that allows an 
entrepreneur to understand.  This knowledge transfer, which usually concerns 
operational or strategic advice, can be offered by a diverse range of individuals, 
including investors.  An incubator can be a crucial guide for ensuring that 
entrepreneurs receive advice from suitable investors.  Although this study’s data 
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tended to reveal that an investor’s advisory influence must be maintained with the 
help of incubation, it is also up to the entrepreneur to help manage the different 
investor agendas. 
Methods
In response, entrepreneurs raised a couple of practical methods to help address a 
surplus of advice.  First, it was suggested that entrepreneurs put together a 
strategic decision-making team composed of business professionals (potentially all 
on staff at the incubator), which would meet often, but only for short periods of 
time.  Zak (1B) remarks:
Same issue when you have individual meetings with people.  Whoever you 
last talked to, you’re at the mercy of their latest scheme.  But, if those three 
or four people were in the same room, they could together argue about the 
next step.
Whereas an entrepreneur is left to filter different advice and then make the best 
decision, a group approach allows for differing views to be debated in order to 
reach a solution.  Some entrepreneurs and incubators have chosen to formalise 
their strategy-making approach by forming an advisory team which resembles a 
board of directors, but it usually does not have the same decision influence as a 
formal board.  Whitney (1A), an incubated entrepreneur commented:
The incubator put us in contact with the people that become our advisory 
board.  When we started that board, we were probably doing a couple 
hundred thousand dollars in revenue.  We were probably closer to a couple 
million dollars by the time we decided we wanted a formal board.
An incubator manager put forward a similar resolution, to that of Whitney’s (1A).  
Sarah (2D) noted that she tries to figure out what her entrepreneurs are not good 
at and what the skill gaps are that they need to fill by hiring or assembling an 
advisory board.  Another incubator manager saw the incubators role as one of 
finding the right contact to disseminate advice to incubating entrepreneurs, which 
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could include connecting the entrepreneur with another incubating CEO.  Jeff (1D) 
comments: 
Sometimes they (incubating entrepreneurs) need to use other parties to 
impart advice in a way that it gets absorbed.  A CEO who is going through 
the same process can be a very powerful ally in your decision making, 
because after all it’s not the incubators business, it’s the entrepreneurs 
business.  They need to make the decision, they need to have the confidence 
that it’s the right thing to do.
The second method to help address this issue is that entrepreneurs have found 
that instead of asking for an advisor’s opinions on a particular problem, they might 
instead make a plan and then gather the corresponding guidance.  Zoe (4B) 
comments:
It’s good to touch base with people.  More-so than getting advice, it’s saying: 
“hey, I’m doing this, should I be, or is this stupid?”  This is quite handy...
Zoe (4B) later states:
It’s about selectively listening, or talking to everyone and picking out bits...  I 
guess the thing I’ve learned is at the end of the day you still have to take the 
lead, it seems to work better that if you have a clear agenda, you just pull the 
resources that you need.
Dissimilar advisory support typically arises from a variety of stakeholders.  If not 
managed well, the entrepreneur will be left without ways in which to decipher or 
sort through a surplus of advice.  If an entrepreneur can take control, by both 
seeking strategic input and filtering that input, they then set themselves up to 
make the best the best decision for their company.  Because strategic decisions 
are of upmost importance, especially with a new venture, it is essential for an 
entrepreneur to ensure they implement tactics to filter advice.
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5.2 Financial Tensions
With money comes influence.  Whether an entrepreneur or an incubator, the 
individuals who provide the financing earn a unique position of influence.  This 
study’s findings revealed this to be the case for start-ups.  The individuals or firms 
who provide much-needed capital are often the ones who hold significant influence 
both on financial and advisory levels.  Their control was particularly felt in terms of 
their effect on the strategic and operational decisions made by the firm.  With 
control in their hands, investors may be prone to propose one-sided arrangements 
that could have detrimental effects for the start-up, over the long-term.  Caleb (3A) 
commented:
We got quite a few poor deals from investors.  The terms and conditions of 
the deals they proposed were shocking.
Another entrepreneur, Karrie (1A), classified investors as a negative aspect of 
starting a company and said that incubators did not do much to help start-ups 
mediate between fair and poor investment arrangements.
The venture capitalists are actually just out there to get you, they’re just out 
there to take advantage of you (the incubating entrepreneur).
In defence of the investors, the New Zealand investor landscape is small in 
comparison to other countries, both in terms of the quantity invested as well as the 
number of investors (e.g. Springall, 2011).  Furthermore, many investors are 
cautious about their investment and want to ensure they put their money in start-
ups that can produce significant returns.  Jessica (3D), an incubator manager 
observed that:
To get investment, the company really has to have one hell of a unique story, 
backed up by some fantastic credentials of the team or individual.
With investors typically earning their wealth in business as well as having more 
experience than the entrepreneur (e.g. Fenn, Liang, and Prowse, 1995), most are 
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not only looking for a significant return, but an abundant return in a short period of 
time (e.g. Springall, 2011).  If this seems unlikey, then many investors are not 
interested in investing in a start-up at all.  Jessica (3D) again commented on a 
businessman's desire for an above average return on investment:
Experienced business people want that (a significant return) and won’t put 
their hand in their pocket if it’s not there.
$
Caleb (3A) also emphasised this point remarking that investors are much more 
willing to put their money in an investment vehicle that provides consistent returns, 
such as the Australian marketplace, than in a volatile New Zealand start-up, which 
could either produce a robust or minimal return, or fail and loose even the 
principle.
Investors don’t want to wait long.  One came to us and asked: “why should I 
invest in your company when I can go to the Australian stock market and get 
a 10% return on investment annually?”
In order to elevate the risks for investors, incubators try and minimise the risk of 
these new ventures by advising them through a bootstrapped market validation 
period whereby they are able to better defend their concept to an investor later on.  
Not only does this help to prepare the start-up to earn investment capital, but it 
also helps to ensure the entrepreneur’s reputation is left intact.  Luke (2C) 
commented:
Reputation is important.  If you ask for the money too soon and your back in 
twelve months asking for more money, then your reputation is not good.
The entrepreneur’s reputation is not the only one preserved in this situation, but 
the incubator’s reputation is protected as well.  An incubator’s reputation blossoms 
in the eyes of their investors if they are growing successful companies.  However, 
not all start-ups can wait for investment dollars.  When this becomes the case, 
they’re forced to pursue funding, but since New Zealand’s investment population is 
relatively small, if an entrepreneur fails a few times, most likely they won’t start 
another company.  The individual will then, in a sense, be forced to return to a 
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position within a company, rather than trying to start their own.  Luke (2C) 
comments:
New Zealand is quite small, different than the States.  If you fail a few times 
in the States they tell me that it’s seen as a good thing.  But if you fail a few 
times here, you’re history.
Financial tensions must be maintained in order that investors can be involved 
though not glorified to a position of influence unattached from their expertise and 
the goals of the entrepreneur.  For example, research has indicated that if this 
tension becomes unbalanced, entrepreneurs might be prone to fall into full 
submission to the investor rather than relying on them for their unique competence 
(e.g. Cable and Shane, 1997).
5.2.1 Alignment Tactics
The data identifed two particular alignment tactics to help resolve financial 
tensions, each of which are focused on regulating or balancing the influence of 
investors.  As explained previous, it was found that entrepreneurs and incubators 
alike are prone to allow their investors substantial influence on the organisation, 
primarily due to their financial influence.  This study revealed that a surplus in this 
financial tension was often the issue, rather than a shortage.  Since this tended to 
be the case, alignment tactics raised below will focus on elevating a surplus of 
support by way of limiting an investor’s influence and endorsing broad investor 
goals.  Several entrepreneurs struggle with a shortage of investors, however, the 
data is inconclusive as to whether a lack of investors is issue enough to effect 
financial tensions.  As such, the following section will focus on the two tactics to 
help align a surplus of financial support.
Limit investor influence
An investor can grow to be too involved in a start-up and its tactics.  As such, 
entrepreneurs and incubators must find ways to limit their influence.  Unless an 
investor’s particular expertise is needed and they are able to communicate their 
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knowledge in a language an entrepreneur can understand, then their influence 
must be limited, particularly concerning advice on both operational or strategic 
matters.  Several of the entrepreneurs observed found it particularly challenging to 
disagree with investors, even though the investor might have been incorrect in 
their guidance.  Zoe (4B) discovered:
A lot of people in the investment business world tend to have quite strong 
personalities and opinions.  At first it was quite hard to go against them, but 
you sort of got to.  Everyone you talk to here has a strong opinion on 
something, even though half of them are wrong.
To more fully illustrate the investor landscape and the different relationships 
involved, there are typically three different classifications of investor start-ups, 
particularly in the New Zealand context.  The first is the incubator.  With each 
incubator taking at least five percent of each venture, these entities are a key 
investor in the venture.  Government funding can be an investor in a start-up as 
well.  Although each of the New Zealand incubators involved in this study receives 
government funding, there are a variety of other forms of funding sourced from 
different ministries and other government entities.  Patrick (4A) comments:
We’ve learned to play that game (government funding).  When I started, I 
wouldn’t have given that the time of day, cause it just seemed like a waste of 
energy.  But in fact, it’s one of the funding vehicles for New Zealand 
companies.  I actually now see it as a valid part of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem.  Albeit, they speak a different language and are from a different 
planet.
As Patrick (4A) discovered, government funding can be helpful, but they also can 
be very difficult to work with.  A third form of funding is angel investment.  The 
entrepreneurs tended to admire angels, especially for their willingness to take a 
risk and for their philanthropic focus.  Patrick (4A) remarks:
I think the angel investors are heros, they take risks beyond the call of duty - 
in a philanthropic way.  They do it because they want to make a difference to 
someone's ideas, or for the good of local business.
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However, not all angels were idyllic.  Other entrepreneurs found angel investors to 
be simply about money and tech start-ups that could eventually be worth billions.  
Caleb (3A) comments:
Some angels weren’t supportive, they didn’t see the value of our business to 
the degree that we saw the value of our business.  They wanted the sexy 
stuff, the stuff that had billions of potential customers.
Venture capitalists were typically the final source of funding.  Patrick (4A) 
described VCs as quite different from the other forms.  He comments:
They were very different.  There were, and still are, quite a small number of 
VC entities and they’re quite easy to distinguish because they had business 
cards, had a company name, and had a track record.  So you could research 
them and when you were meeting with a VC, you knew you weren’t meeting 
with an amateur.  An angel on the other hand could have very little 
knowledge of investment, but they were doing it because of your passion or 
because of their desire to help.
The relationships between the investors and the different pressures put on the 
entrepreneurs can be different from one investor to another.  Nate (4B) observed 
that the incubator in particular was quite happy with taking a longer-term view, 
whereas his other investor stakeholders were more interested in the short-term.  
He remarks:
There is a pressure to grow companies fast and to produce financial returns.  
Understandably, I’m completely in line with that.  But, I suppose the pressure 
is higher from my actual company’s stakeholders as opposed to the 
incubators stakeholders - they’re a bit happier to take the longer-term view.
Zoe (4B) also found himself in a similar position to Nate (4B) and comments:
60
I think often there is, even between the incubator and the other investors, 
sometimes they have kind of a different agenda.  It’s kind of tricky managing 
that, or managing what they think of each other.
Entrepreneurs and incubators who enact strategies that help to regulate investors 
to less involvement can be helpful in ensuring that a surplus of financial tension is 
lessened.  One method to do this is for entrepreneurs to manage the different 
investor personalities so that the relationships and advice received from investors 
works best on behalf of the start-up.  Nate (4B) remarks:
Every investor I’ve worked with genuinely wants the businesses to succeed, 
but it’s like any group, there will always be personality clashes and those 
sorts of things.
Along similar lines, Zoe (4B) comments:
It really just comes down to managing everyone’s agenda.  Everyone seems 
to have a different one, which is frustrating, but it’s sort of identifying that and 
managing it.  One says A and the other recommends B, but then you go and 
do C.  There’s a bit of that.
Establish broad investor goals
Entrepreneurs tended to believe that financial tensions, especially those shared 
between themselves and the incubator, could be alleviated if there was a clear 
understanding of each other’s expectations and goals.  Within the New Zealand 
context, both the incubator and entrepreneur are tasked with creating 
internationally-focused companies.  Patrick (4A) remarked:
The idea to have an internationally viable product really was formed at the 
time I entered the incubator and saw that their (the incubator’s) vision was to 
grow some hundred-million-dollar New Zealand companies.
With many of the entrepreneurs and incubators having financial stakeholders with 
broad, yet aligned expectations (i.e. growing global company’s for New Zealand), 
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the data showed that the goals of an entrepreneur, incubator, and other 
stakeholders can be quite different and often overly ambiguous.  As a result of 
these incongruences, an entrepreneur’s priorities may be suddenly put on hold for 
one of their investors, particularly the incubator.  Karrie (1A) observed:
The staff of the incubator need to be accountable to what they’re doing and 
sometimes to validate what they’re doing, they may or may not have the best 
interest of the company in play.
Karrie raises an interesting conundrum.  In her experience, the incubator is at 
times in a position where they use the entrepreneurs to substantiate their own 
egocentric goals.  Although this relationship should be mutually beneficial, as an 
investor of the entrepreneur, the incubator has a unique influential position to take 
advantage of the entrepreneur by pursuing their own motives, which can at times 
prove detrimental to the entrepreneur.  When this becomes the case, it can be 
damaging for both parties involved.  Trevor (1A), whose start-up failed in 
incubation, framed this issue up appropriately commenting:
At times it did feel like they were doing things for their reasons rather than my 
company’s reasons.  But, that’s kind of expected, it’s part of the deal.
Incubators taking advantage of an entrepreneur happens, but it should not be part 
of the deal.  Instead, it is part of a financial tension in which one party has a 
surplus of influence.  In Trevor (1A)’s case, his relationship with the incubator 
deteriorated to a point where his arrangement became increasingly one-sided.  He 
comments:
The focus became more about growth and expectations than meeting my 
own goals and achievements.
In hindsight, Trevor (1A)’s goals were quite different from that of the incubator, and 
so each party’s expectations were not maintained.  Other entrepreneurs of the 
same incubator, however, had experiences very different from Trevor (1A)’s.  
Whitney (1A) commented:
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There was no conflict, the incubator was always acting in the interest of my 
company.
Method: Communicate Individual Goals
Goals that are not communicated and happen to be conflicting with the other 
party’s goals are the ones that appear to be the point of conflict, whereas the 
overarching and clearly communicated objectives are understood and respected 
by the involved parties.  For example, Jessica (3D), has commented that her 
incubator communicates clearly and is upfront with entrepreneurs regarding their 
primary objectives and their expectations of the incubating entrepreneurs:
We make it quite clear that we’re a commercial entity and they’re not here as 
an academic exercise.
One of the incubators not only disseminates their market-oriented objectives 
verbally, but they also explain them to entrepreneurs more intangibly by way of the 
incubator environment, the language used by incubator managers, and the ways 
in which they celebrate success.  Current incubating entrepreneurs acknowledge 
the incubator’s commercial goals.  Bobby (3B) noted:
They (the incubator) will always have their agenda.  The incubator, at its 
heart is a funding organisation, that has a percentage of your company.  But, 
it’s in their interest for your business to succeed.
Bobby’s last line is especially interesting, because it is when the entrepreneur’s 
goals for success differ from their stakeholders that the healthy financial tension 
becomes fragmented.  In response, one incubator put strategies in place to 
mediate the issue, especially pertaining to managing each of the involved parties 
to help alleviate incongruent goals.  Bobby (3B) remarks:
In the new work we do with them (the entrepreneurs), we try and understand 
what the individual entrepreneur wants to do and the impacts around them 
and the effects of what they’re about to embark on.  Whereas in the early 
63
days it was all about - wow, you know I felt good about them, I’m sure they’re 
going to try hard, and then they fail...
Incubators must also know that entrepreneurs strategies and plans may change 
overtime.   Claire (1A) asserts that mistakes are made and that it’s important to 
allow plans to evolve.  She comments:
I’ve tried that and it doesn’t work and I may have not screwed up in that, but 
it didn’t work and therefore I’m not going to repeat that and I’m going to try 
something else.
It is the nature of an entrepreneur to morph and adapt to different market 
conditions.  Investors must take this into account and have goals broad enough to 
challenge them, but which also allow a bit of flexibility and freedom for the 
entrepreneur to make adjustments along the way.  Jeff (1D) comments:
We’re driving them with their own mandate, which is interesting, because 
how do you balance that with the fact that the entrepreneur is an 
entrepreneur and only wants to do what they want to do.  There’s an 
interesting tension between accelerating them, within a framework we know 
that works, and giving them enough openness to work in so that the 
entrepreneurial spirit can do its best work.
The need also arose to regulate the different goals between incubators and their 
investors.  Despite NZTE’s substantial investment in business incubation, they 
allow each of the individual incubators to operate more or less autonomously and 
outside of an overarching strategy and routine qualitative reviews, NZTE is 
relatively uninvolved.  Sarah (2D) commented on their main investor’s particular 
goals for the incubator:
For our major funder, NZTE, it’s creating sustainable and quality deal flow 
companies for New Zealand.
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In other words, NZTE tasks business incubators with creating new companies 
whose revenues outperform their costs as well as earn the bulk of their revenue 
from international sales.  
Method: Create Broad Goals Together
The tension between an entrepreneur and the incubator, one of their investors, is 
also alleviated with the establishment of goals that are relatively broad in nature.  
Bobby (3B) comments:
We’re a part of a bigger goal, which is really about returning the best 
business results for New Zealand.
To help enact these broad goals, another incubator strategist mentioned that their 
main investors encouraged them to diversify their stakeholders and not associate 
too closely with any one entity.  Jeff (1D) comments:
Interestingly, NZTE put a bit of pressure on us and other incubators to not 
associate closely with any one funding entity.  They wanted a more generic 
mandate and a more generic equity owner base.
Enacting broad goals ended up also changing the incubator’s governance 
structure.  Jeff (1D) remarks:
We had to change our governance structure where we formed our own 
independent board.
Although each incubator will have more detailed goals than returning the best 
business results for New Zealand, they will be well suited to perform successfully.  
In sum, it was discovered that a surplus in financial tensions can be managed with 
clearly understood goals by both parties, yet broad and overarching goals between 
both entrepreneurs and investors as well as between incubators and investors.
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5.3 Ethotic Tensions
This study revealed that an incubator’s ethos can empower or discourage start-
ups from moving forward.  Ethos is the characteristic spirit of a culture or 
community as manifested in its values and aspirations (Oxford Dictionary, 2012).  
Kenny and Goe (2004) pointed to the concept of ethos and social embeddedness 
as a key intangible that led to entrepreneurial endeavors by professors in 
particular university departments.  A connected community-minded ethos will help 
to either encourage or discourage particular behaviours.  In organisational studies, 
we often see this in HR literature, where the company culture either helps or 
hinders efficient work environments (e.g. OʼMahoney, 2007).  Business incubators 
and corporations are similar in this regard, their ethos contribute to favorable or 
adverse organisational outcomes.  However, in business incubation two 
organisations are effected - both the incubator and the incubating companies.  
This indirect influence was found to also greatly impact the business.
Due to its intangible nature, an organisation’s ethos can be difficult to grasp and 
explain, but the concept of an organisation’s environment is much more of a 
comprehensible and communicable representation of a collective ethos.  By 
environment, this study particularly refers to the surroundings or conditions in 
which an individual works.  The environment of an incubator could be compared to 
a corporate environment, except that corporations might have different business 
units with an umbrella leadership team.  An incubator instead has separate 
autonomous businesses along with a team of incubator support staff, who as 
participants in this thesis tend to also form a provisional leadership team for the 
company’s as they get started.  
The entrepreneur participants would describe an organisation’s environment using 
words and phrases such as: funky (Whitney, 1A), high-energy (Jared, 1C), sense 
of camaraderie (Karrie, 1A), serious fun (Sam, 1B), and family (Stephen, 2B).  As 
Rachel (4D), the incubator manager put it:
It’s all fluff, but it’s the tempo that helps everyone keep going.
66
5.3.1 Advantages: Privacy, Validation, Guidance, and a Sense of 
Camaraderie
On the whole, entrepreneurs tended to emphasise the importance of the incubator 
environment and as such, the broader ethos.  These were seen as key 
contributors to the success or failure of the start-ups.  Although different words 
were used to describe the incubator environment, entrepreneurs tended to 
collectively see a beneficial incubator environment as consisting of core 
characteristics like privacy, validation, source for guidance, and a sense of 
camaraderie.  Whitney (1A) remarks:
You’ve got a bunch of people doing what they want to do, everyone’s working 
hard, and there’s a real shared camaraderie in doing what were doing.
Karrie (1A), goes on to similarly remark:
$
There’s certainly camaraderie and kinship with us all going through the same 
thing.
A sense of camaraderie that came from working with and around other individuals 
who were living the similar lifestyle of starting a business.  Sometimes this sense 
of camaraderie was communicated as a sense of family.  Stephen (2B), an 
incubating entrepreneur commented: “It’s kind of like a bit of a family.”
Related to a sense of camaraderie, the concept of validation was also reported by 
participants as a core characteristic of the incubator ethos.  It is as Matt (3C), an 
incubator CEO discovered that validation is a key aspect of incubation, from the 
entrepreneur’s point of view.  He comments:
From the entrepreneurs point of view, it’s validation - that we believe in them.  
Zak (1B) also observed this firsthand:
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It’s (supportive environment) made a crucial difference, we probably would 
have burnt out a while ago.
Validation helped Zak (1B) to continue running his new venture.  Stephen (2B) 
also understood first hand how important validation is for incubating 
entrepreneurs.  He describes it as a gift that guards you from psychological villains 
that will bring down your business.  He remarks:
I think doubt is the biggest villain.  That’s the kicker.  That and panic is 
another villain.  When you think it’s going to fold and then your brain goes off, 
people like the incubator CEO will help to bring it back.
Susan (2B), an incubating entrepreneur found that there were several skeptics 
outside of the incubator who sought to barrier her and her idea, but, her incubator 
helped to validate what she was doing and shield her from doubt.  She comments:
There are people that don’t want me to succeed.  There are other people that 
believe the issue needs to be resolved using an alternative solution.  And if I 
succeed, it proves that I was wrong.  In a way though, the incubator 
environment protects me from that.  I know what I’m doing is right and I know 
what I will do will be successful.
In order to have validation and a sense of camaraderie, one assumes there is 
already a trusting incubator ethos.  In the study, a trusting incubator tended to be 
representative of a respectful environment where privacy was maintained.  The 
incubator was described as a place where entrepreneurs could be open and 
honest with one another, particularly about their business, whereas the 
entrepreneur outside of the business incubator felt pressured to maintained a 
positive rhetoric that they and their business were doing well, when in fact, they 
might instead be struggling through a challenging stage. No matter what was said 
within the incubator, however, privacy would be maintained and sensitive 
conversation would never leak to unexpected people and places.  Karrie (1A) 
comments:
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Confidentiality and trust was kept.  That was was really nice in the incubator, 
you felt like you could be saying anything about your business and it wasn’t 
walking out the door.  It was sort of a built in trust locker.
The final advantage of a productive incubator ethos is the unstructured guidance 
that is provided to the tenants by their peers.  Guidance tended to differ from the 
gained knowledge described in the advisory section in two particular ways.  First, 
the entrepreneurs share information and knowledge amongst themselves rather 
than only learning from the incubator and their other key people.  Second, it 
differed according to the way the knowledge is disseminated.  Often entrepreneurs 
share information casually. It is typically unstructured and impromptu, whereas the 
incubator and other key people tend to provide knowledge with a more structured 
approach.  Nate (4B) comments:
I think part of the belonging thing, is working in a group and sharing the 
group knowledge and the group enthusiasm - trying to motivate each other 
as a group.
As Nate (4B) alludes, the support he found in the incubator was not only 
knowledge-based, but was also the unstructured motivation from the other 
tenants.  The data revealed that Nate (4B) was not alone in this and that the 
entrepreneurs on the whole experienced this final advantage.  He went on to 
report in greater detail regarding the start-up support he found in incubation:
You get a really large bunch of intelligent people from different backgrounds, 
we’re all helping each other, we all had contacts in different areas where we 
could each feed off each other, then there was just an excitement around the 
place, someone makes a good phone call, everyone else is congratulating 
them.  The word gets around to everyone that they did a good phone call, the 
energy level is really high.
In the end, this study revealed four advantages of a productive incubator ethos.  
However, unless a productive ethos is cultivated within an incubator, these 
benefits will struggle to be actualised.  The next section reveals a few ways in 
which a productive ethos is cultivated in incubation.
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5.3.2 Cultivate a Productive Ethos: Peer Relationships, Take Time, 
Make Introductions
This study returned three particular methods by which to cultivate a productive 
ethos.  Each of these methods helped incubating entrepreneurs actualise the three 
advantages of a beneficial incubator ethos.  The first is peer relationships.  
Sharing the common vocation of starting a business contributes greatly to 
cultivating a productive ethos.  As Katie (1A) noted, the act of starting a business 
is a very personal journey and is generally different from most others in society 
who work for established organisations.  Frasier (1A) also points out that launching 
into a career as an entrepreneur is a countercultural move and one that propels 
you into a small group of people.
When you do this stuff you’re weird, because the vast majority of people, 
even if they have an idea that they think is great - they won’t do anything 
about it.  You can’t imagine how many times someone said, I’ve had an idea 
once.  But that’s it!  All they had was the idea.
In incubation, though, these “weird people”, these entrepreneurs, are brought 
together where they are able to share in each other’s journey.  There is a 
consensus amongst entrepreneurs that they are not starting a business alone but 
are doing it together with other entrepreneurs, the incubator, and their network of 
other key people.  They might not have any employees to share the experience 
with but because they have put themselves in an incubator environment, there 
tends to be an advantage from the sense of camaraderie.  Frasier (1A) remarks:
The value of having a whole bunch of really committed people who are taking 
a step away from the ordinary path of life, but they’re doing it together.  They 
find themselves together.  That gives each of them a strength.
There is a potential for entrepreneurship to be quite a lonely journey, and to be 
able to connect with the advantages that come from an incubator ethos, one of the 
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key underpinnings is to share the start-up journey with other like-minded 
entrepreneurs.  Whitney (1A), remarks:
For us the main benefit, and I’ve often said this, wasn’t really the incubator, it 
was the people at the incubator.  It was the kind of camaraderie and shared 
experience which made it special.
Katie (1A), another entrepreneur points to the supportive energy in an incubator, 
that’s shared between entrepreneurs in a similar situation.
The certain energy was the same.  They (the other entrepreneurs) equally 
wanted you to do well.  It’s a strong thing and I’m not quite sure why.
Claire (1A) commented that entrepreneurship is a unique experience that cannot 
be shared by others who have not experienced it firsthand.
You can share some experiences with people who haven’t done it 
themselves, but nothing can simulate the sense of having your entire 
livelihood and ass on the line.
The data tended to highlight two particular ways in which peers are able to 
develop beneficial relationships with one another.  The first is the concept of 
working together, or collaborating.  It was found that when entrepreneurs gather 
together and share knowledge openly with one another, they are able to help each 
other past certain obstacles that would be much more challenging had they been 
forced to confront them alone.  The knowledge gained could be simply a passing 
comment from another entrepreneur, or it could be a substantial amount of helpful 
advice.  Zoe (4B) remarks:
It is quite good having that team around.  I’s a good environment to be in, 
your not kind of siloed alone, chipping away.  You’ve got people going: “what 
are doing” and they’re not just keeping an eye on you, but are making sure 
your doing it properly, which is quite helpful.
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Some entrepreneurs pointed to peer relationships as a key variable or prerequisite 
to connecting with the advantages of incubation.  Katie (1A) commented:
It’s really fundamental.  You’ve got to have really awesome people - other 
entrepreneurs that are there and willing to share their journey with their fellow 
incubatees.  That’s vital.
The second way in which peers are able to develop beneficial relationships with 
one another was by sharing honest and objective feedback with one another.  
Frasier (1A) indicated that other start-up kind of people are able to provide 
necessary feedback that cannot come from other sources.  Jim explained that this 
was due to the similar position of each tenant.  He remarks:
When you’re around people who are doing the same thing - day after day - 
you can be real because one of the things you learn is that everyone is doing 
a little smoke and mirrors - a little of spin and gloss - cause you don’t hang 
out your dirty washing for everyone to see.  But for the people in it with you - 
there’s not so much to hide.
Frasier (1A) alludes that there are certain things you can only share with others 
who are also actively involved in entrepreneurship and are enrolled in the 
incubator.  He goes on to comment:
There’s a really good sense of camaraderie - that were in this together and 
that you can tell each other stuff you wouldn’t tell an outsider.
Typically, entrepreneurs would share honestly and openly with one another what 
they had learned during their start-up experiences.  Sam (1B) discovered:
Being around other people, it’s nice to have a good chat and share your 
knowledge.
Caleb (3A), similarly commented that this was one of the most beneficial aspects 
of incubation for his company:
The engagement of fellow incubated companies, to hear what they’ve 
learned and experienced.
Stephen (2B), another incubating entrepreneur similarly remarked that it is 
important to develop relationships with other incubators, particularly the new 
entrepreneurs who can benefit most from these relationships.  He remarks:
At first it’s just: get, get, get.  You want help, you want advice.  It’s always on 
your terms - your the small person with no money.  But, I’ve found as we’ve 
grown that it’s $a relationship, you give back.  You go and talk to the up-and-
comers in the same field.  It’s hard for some of the younger guys who want to 
get their idea out, but their without feedback.  It’s a two way street.
Although providing honest, objective feedback is important in developing peer 
relationships, as Stephen (2B) indicated above that there was limited time to 
spend with other peers.  The entrepreneurs were typically extremely busy and 
caught up in their own company tasks.  As this was often found to be the case, the 
second element for cultivating a productive ethos is taking time.  As Whitney (1A) 
indicates, despite their limited availably, entrepreneurs typically found time 
amongst their busyness to connect with other incubating entrepreneurs.  She 
remarks:
When you are heads down, you’re working all hours of a day, not deliberately  
connecting with someone who does something very different from you - 
you’re just not going to do it, there’s no real reason to connect, which is why 
the parties, social events, and the Friday drinks were so important - it 
provided an excuse.
Frasier (1A) also found valuable time to spend with other entrepreneurs in 
common areas, such as the shared kitchen.
You bump into each other in the kitchen and start to talk through what’s going 
on with you - your often working very long hours in the same building and in 
an open floor plan office.
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Although all members of the incubator ecosystem contribute to the incubators 
ethos, the data tended to emphasise the entrepreneur’s participation in this 
regard.  Nate (4B) commented:
The culture of the incubator is really driven by the companies in it, a you get 
out what you put in sort of thing.
Finally, the introduction of fellow incubating entrepreneurs by incubator managers 
proved valuable in cultivating a productive ethos in the incubator.  The data 
indicated that incubator managers might connect entrepreneurs, particularly if they 
think one can help the other with a certain problem.  Luke (2C) shared about the 
willingness of incubatees to give another entrepreneur some of their time.
In some situations, I will say (to a tenant) that this guy (other entrepreneur) 
actually needs your help.  Everyone of the other company’s have said: 
“happy to give the time.”
Sometimes introductions are the key way in which incubating entrepreneurs 
connect with one another.  As Matt (3C) indicated, tenants are busy and do not 
necessarily do a good job connecting with one another, unless they are 
introduced.  He remarks:
They (incubating entrepreneurs) work together and share and learn from one 
another.  But I think also, most of them won’t share and work together if you 
don’t facilitate them.  A key part of what we’re about is trying to get them to 
network and to share experiences.  It’s hard though, because I think they 
naturally don’t do that.  They just want to get on and do it.
Matt (3C) goes on to say that the act of making introductions must not only happen 
once or twice, but that introductions must be made continuously by both peers and 
incubator staff.  He comments:
You need people who are bring people together always and create events 
that give people a shared learning experience and creates a common bond.
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In sum, an incubators ethos, may produce a variety of advantages for the 
incubating companies, including the creation of a environment that’s validating, 
private, where guidance can be found, and there’s a sense of camaraderie.
5.3.3 Alignment Tactics
Whereas tensions can reach inflection points for both advisory and financial 
tensions, ethos tensions are no different.  In order to confront this issue, there 
were two particular alignment tactics that were unveiled from the data.  The first 
confronts a shortage in collective lifestyle and is appropriately titled independent.  
The second is titled dependent and it addresses an abundance of collective 
lifestyle. 
Independent
Those incubating entrepreneurs who remove themselves or choose to stay 
independent and not participate in the incubator, do not receive the advantages 
that come with an empowering incubator ethos.  The data tended to show that 
entrepreneurs who took a more independent and uninvolved position might have 
lacked the character traits and the relationships with stakeholders prerequisite to 
achieving a sense of togetherness or community within incubation.  Frasier (1A) 
comments:
There’s real benefits in having certain virtues or certain types of character 
traits as apart of your personality when your in an incubator.  It comes down 
to being polite and not being rude.
Even though traits, such as being polite and not being rude, are relatively simple, 
the data tended to emphasise that they must be principally maintained in 
incubation because of the effort each entrepreneur is giving to try and transform 
their idea into an actual, sustainable venture.  Frasier (1A) remarks:
It’s extra necessary to have those key traits because your all so focused on 
what your doing.  Every bit of your life is being poured into this thing.
Without these beneficial traits, entrepreneurs do not tend to be willing to share 
their journey with others.  Although they might be on a similar entrepreneurial 
journey as others in the incubator, they must have certain personality traits that 
lend to being open to sharing their journey with others.
With an understanding that certain character traits are important to cultivate a 
sense of camaraderie, incubator managers can then make selection decisions that 
are indicative of the type of ethos they look to cultivate.  For example, Sarah (2D) 
comments:
It’s less about the idea of the business, and more about the people.  We’re 
sort of trying to figure out if they’re the right people to work with us.  One of 
the main things for us is fit.  The right person with the right attitude and an 
average idea will be really successful, as apposed to the greatest idea with 
the wrong attitude.
If other entrepreneurs entered the cohort without the character traits that 
contributed to the sense of camaraderie, it brought down the rest of the group.  
Frasier (1A) comments:
If you had someone that disrupted the coherence of the group and peoples 
fellow feelings it would bring everyone down.
In addition to cultivating or selecting a group of entrepreneurs with certain 
beneficial character traits, the data also stressed the importance of supportive 
external stakeholders of an entrepreneur.  Sarah (2D) commented:
If they don’t have a supportive environment, they’re not going to make it.
Outside of the incubator, these stakeholders particularly tend to be an 
entrepreneur’s family and friends, but although they’re technically on the outside of 
incubation, even the incubator managers stressed the important contribution they 
make towards the success or failure of the entrepreneurial venture.  Sarah (2D) 
comments:
76
It totally depends on who the stakeholders are.  You get anyone from the 
families and partners who are not supportive, the entrepreneur is not going to 
be successful.
Jessica (3D) has learned that it is crucial to evaluate the impact of an entrepreneur 
lifestyle has on someone’s key people - like they’re family and friends.  She 
comments:
In our selection of those early stages we try and understand if it 
(entrepreneurship) will have too much impact on their lives and on their 
family.  We see a lot of entrepreneurs fail by not understanding that.
However, incubators have found that their ideal entrepreneur candidates are more 
prone to start a business themselves, regardless of the help the incubator thinks 
they can provide.  Sarah (2D) comments:
A lot of people we believe are the right people, whom we could add a lot of 
value to, are usually the people who say: “Incubators - nope.  I’ll do it myself.”
Nate (4B) seemed to see small groups as problematic in incubation and 
emphasised the necessity of large and diverse groups of entrepreneurs working in 
the same space.  He remarks:
I think it’s important to have a good amount of people involved.  If you can 
get it to the point where there’s enough people and enough skill sets in the 
incubator, then it starts to feed on itself and is quite critical to business 
development.
Some incubator managers have blamed the critics of incubation for bad mouthing 
the industry.  Whereas others have simply taken the blame themselves, noting 
poor communication of the incubator’s value proposition.  Karrie (1A), touches on 
the importance of an incubator articulating the value they provide effectively.  She 
remarks:
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Finding a message of what the incubator does isn’t very clear.  I don’t think 
its communicated very well to the community or internationally - as well as it 
can be.
Dependent
Within incubation, entrepreneurs can grow dependent on the incubator’s ethos 
and particularly the collective lifestyle shared between entrepreneurs.  When this 
becomes the case, entrepreneurs are left with too much of a good thing.  The data 
tended to show that too much dependency on the incubators ethos can prevent 
the entrepreneur from developing and progressing their business beyond the start-
up phase.  Karrie (1A) comments:
One of the things that I think is interesting about incubation - is that when 
you’re in an incubator it’s OK to be a start-up.  But, when you are a start-up it 
almost feels like you can get stuck in the start-up phase.  Or maybe you don’t 
get stuck, but it can be challenging to get out that phase of that because 
everybody in the incubator’s in that same situation.
Now that Karrie (1A) is graduated from incubation, she now has a very different 
perspective on new businesses and the issue with getting stuck in the start-up 
phase.  She remarks, as an entrepreneur now working outside of incubation:
Whereas now, I’m in and around businesses, I’m looking at them and seeing 
that they’re just doing it and I think that there is huge value in that.
Zak (1B) has also found a similar benefit from becoming less dependent.  He 
comments:
Being hooked into the bigger start-up network has made a big difference.
Likewise, Karrie (1A) went on to express:
Collaboration just outside of the incubator has been the most valuable.
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When entrepreneurs grow to be too dependent on the collective lifestyle shared 
with other entrepreneurs in the incubator, they can get caught or stuck in the start-
up phase rather than growing beyond their early beginnings into sustainable 
ventures.  In a similar fashion, entrepreneurs can be prone to be too independent 
whereby they lack the benefits that a collective lifestyle can afford.  In sum, the 
data tended to show that entrepreneurs and incubators alike must maintain a 
healthy ethotic tension between too much or too little collective identity.
As both entrepreneurs and incubator managers alike denote importance to a 
collective lifestyle amongst the entrepreneurs in incubation, incubators cultivate 
such a collective not only through a thoughtful selection process that takes into 
account the personality of participants and key stakeholders, but also through 
creating a physical space that can help to foster such an ethos.  Since incubation 
typically occurs in a physical location, an office building, there are certain aspects 
of the space that help to bring the entrepreneurs together.
A well run incubator is about a space to collaborate and grow together - that 
includes the physical space.
Nate (4B) remarks:
I suppose it has to partly depend on the building, but everyone does cluster 
together.  We’ve already got sort of open door policy where everyone sticks 
their head in the door: “Hey do you know anything about this?  What are you 
doing for lunch.”
Whitney (1A) elaborates on the importance of the physical space by talking about 
the little things that help to bring entrepreneurs together so they can realise the 
advantages.  She comments:
It’s probably silly things, but a well run incubator probably has a massive 
table where people can share lunch together.  That’s where good stuff 
happens.
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5.4 Conclusion
The data pointed not only to the importance of the relationships within incubation, 
but also to the significance of stakeholder relationships for both entrepreneurs and 
incubators.  These findings, when brought together, indicated three categories of 
tensions: advisory, financial, and ethotic - each contributing, in their differing ways, 
to entrepreneurship and incubation outcomes.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion
6.1 Introduction
The notion that there can be either a shortage or surplus of tensions corresponds 
nicely to the concept of social capital and particularly Boschma’s (2006) five forms 
of proximity. Taken together, a balanced level of proximity helps to ensure optimal 
levels of social capital and thus allows knowledge to be shared between different 
parties.  The following chapter will use Boschma’s (2006) framework to illustrate 
the three relational tensions that face entrepreneurs, incubators, and their different 
stakeholders.  This discussion chapter is divided into five main sections that 
correspond with the five areas of proximity introduced by Boschma (2006).  Using 
a social capital lens with an eye towards the network perspective, the following 
presents a fresh viewpoint to understand how these tensions develop and how 
they may be realigned.
Boschma (2006) argues that the transfer of knowledge between actors is not 
governed by geographic proximity alone, but rather by four other forms of 
proximity, some of which are even of greater importance than the geographic 
proximity of knowledge-sharing actors.  Moreover, too little or too much proximity 
of each dimension may be harmful for effective learning and innovation.  The 
following chapter will introduce and discuss each of the five forms of proximity, 
modeling out how actors may have too much or too little of one form of proximity.
6.2 Cognitive Proximity
Entrepreneurs typically lack vital knowledge required to start and grow a business.  
In order to fill in their comprehension gaps, they turn to advisors who typically 
provide valuable business-related knowledge (e.g. Lorraine et al., 2009).  In the 
previous chapter this insight was subdivided as either strategic or operational.  
Many of the entrepreneurs found these valuable resources in and through the 
incubator.  Nate (4B) remarked:
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The incubator has been integral in what I’ve been doing.  I’ve said it before, 
my company wouldn’t exist if the incubator hadn’t taken it by the hand and 
led me.
Although participants of this study, such as Nate (4B), agreed that the incubation 
process was thorough and thoughtful, they also found that advisory pairings could 
be problematic and that they may eventually lead to poor advisory support.  When 
this became the case, the actors were found to lack the necessary requirements to 
effectively communicate with one another.  This dissonance tended to either 
manifest itself as the start-up was left with a shortage or overwhelmed with a 
surplus of advisory support.
Boschma’s (2006) concept of cognitive proximity relates well to advisory tensions 
observed in this research.  He argues that actors may fill up or level off 
communicative gaps to reduce cognitive distance between one another.  In other 
words, the cognitive proximity between actors must not be too great or too small to 
prevent new knowledge from being communicated and understood.  There are a 
variety of factors that can prevent knowledge transfer and therefore unhinge the 
healthy advisory tensions that ensures entrepreneurs receive the advice they 
need.  This section will illustrate the advisory tensions using Boschma’s (2006) 
concept of cognitive proximity.
6.2.1 Levels of Proximity
Cognitive proximity helps to facilitate effective communication by way of ensuring 
a shared understanding between the individuals involved.  Two actors with 
cognitive proximity share a common vocabulary or a common narrative, which 
could be typified by a shared experience.  For example, two actors that have both 
started a business share a common story because they have each been through a 
similar experience.  Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) propose that a shared 
understanding of meaning between individuals results in knowledge transfer.  One 
example of this comes in the form of a shared narrative.  However, the bringing 
together of effective knowledge transfer is not easy, even between actors who 
have shared many of the same experiences.  At the core, effective knowledge 
transfer requires actors to absorb knowledge and then identify, interpret, and 
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exploit what they have learned.  Knowledge transfer requires some level of 
cognitive proximity, even if it is only minimal.  Additionally, the cost of bringing 
together the right diverse knowledge cannot be too high, which would prevent 
knowledge from being shared (Boschma, 2006). 
Many of the interviewed entrepreneurs had backgrounds in science, engineering, 
and industrial design, but were without much experience in managing people, 
sales and marketing, or other key tasks of running a venture.  These participants 
had operational and strategic knowledge gaps.  Reflecting on his entrepreneurial 
experience, Frasier (1A) comments:
Advice is really important - if you don’t have it, you really don’t have much 
that is going to help your business.
From an incubator’s point of view, there is an abundance of knowledge available 
for the entrepreneur.  Sarah (2D), an incubator strategist remarks:
There is such a big knowledge depository here in the incubator that they can 
tap into and utilize.
As both Frasier (1A) and Sarah (2D) point out, advice is extremely important for 
entrepreneurs and incubators can be a source to bridge the gap between 
entrepreneur and advisor so that knowledge is effectively transferred.  However, 
tensions may arise when entrepreneurs have too much or too little cognitive 
proximity.
Too Much
Too much cognitive proximity may lead to lock-in, which is a lack of openness and 
flexibility to expand outside of one’s established networks (Boschma, 2006).  An 
excessive amount of lock-in can prevent actors from connecting with novel 
sources of advice that can provide them with valuable new knowledge.
As Boschma (2006) describes, most actors who experience lock-in tend to stay 
within their established networks rather than expanding outside of them by 
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meeting new and diverse groups of people.  In other words, the actor that does not 
cultivate networks of contacts who are diverse in their skills and interests, will 
inevitably be prevented from being exposed to new ideas and viewpoints that 
might be held by other people outside their current network.  When this takes 
place, there becomes too much cognitive proximity shared between parties so that 
they are unable to learn from each other or are unable to move beyond their 
existing sources of advisory support to connect with vital information held by 
parties or networks outside of their own.  
This concept of cognitive lock-in illustrates one way in which an individual may 
reach a certain stage of development where they are no longer able to develop 
and grow.  In a sense, they are stuck, unable to progress beyond their current 
situation.  However, by expanding outside of their current network to make new 
friends and contacts, who, for example, have different areas of expertise or 
different viewpoints on a particular topic, they may find a way out of what seems to 
be an immovable phase.
There were a handful of ways the participants became lodged in certain phases 
and were without what seemed to be a clear way to get out. Many entrepreneurs 
in incubators were prone to become stuck in the start-up phase and unable to 
move beyond it in order to connect with the knowledge they need.  In other words, 
an entrepreneur could not quite get past being a start-up in order to move on to 
developing a fully functioning venture.  Several of the participants credited the 
incubator’s culture as something that is incredibly important in helping start-ups to 
develop.  However, participants also simultaneously found that the nature of an 
incubator as a club can prevent entrepreneurs from seeing their businesses as 
operating independently of the incubator.  Jared (1C), an incubator CEO 
comments on his incubator’s culture:
We’d like to think that they belong to this club, which they define the culture 
of the club. 
Here, Jared (1C) touches on a poignant and potentially detrimental metaphor of 
incubation for an entrepreneurial tenant.  Entrepreneurs help create the culture of 
an incubator in such a way that helps their business develop, but in doing so, what 
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appears as a healthy incubator club can quickly evolve into an unhealthy 
confinement whereby the members no longer are exposed to or fail to expose 
themselves to novel sources of knowledge.  When this becomes the case, too 
much cognitive proximity may lead to cognitive lock-in which obscures 
entrepreneurs from looking beyond their present situation to view new 
technologies or new market possibilities (Boschma, 2006).  Outside of clustering 
exclusively with the same people, an actor’s routines or habits can prevent them 
from engaging with new knowledge.  Several of the participants of this study, 
particularly the entrepreneurs who had graduated from the incubator, found that 
one of their vital sources of new knowledge came from individuals outside of the 
incubator.  Karrie (1A), for example found that her collaboration with individuals 
outside of the incubator has been some of the most valuable experiences she had 
while she was incubating.  By connecting with new knowledge in local universities, 
industry, and government, Karrie (1A) was able to grow her venture beyond the 
incubator.  In a similar way, Zak (1B) helped to sort through the diverse advice he 
would receive by engaging with individuals in the broader business community, 
outside of the incubator.  Being a part of the incubator helped him hook into this 
larger network.  He commented:
Being hooked into the bigger network so you can be linked all together.  
Having access to all those people has made a big difference.
Although participants reported on different forms of cognitive lock-in, several 
entrepreneurs found themselves overwhelmed by the multitude of new knowledge 
in their incubator.  When there becomes an excess of available new knowledge, it 
becomes more about trying to better connect with the people in your current 
network, rather than always searching for novel sources elsewhere.  Susan (2B) 
found her incubator to be packed full with new knowledge that she has not yet and 
will never fully tap into.  She comments:
I’ve loved being in an incubator environment where the people have really 
good brains, really intelligent people.  Thinking about really interesting things, 
throwing really amazing ideas around and for me, that’s a really stimulating 
environment to be in.  You don’t get exposure to those things outside in the 
real world.  You don’t find that much outside.  We’ve got engineers, 
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physicists, and you catch their conversations and you know that your in the 
presence of some very bright people.  
Susan (2B) goes on to mention that these individuals have not only been inspiring, 
but they have helped to directly contribute to the success of her start-up.
To be part of that in and of itself is inspiring and makes it exciting.  You see 
what people are doing and the projects they’re working on have a real wow 
factor!  My product has been impacted by that as well.  I thought, well, I don’t 
need to be limited only in my thinking.
In terms of development time, she estimates that being exposed to these novel 
sources of knowledge in and through the incubator has significantly reduced her 
start-up time.  She remarks:
What being apart of an incubation programmeme has done, is that we’ve 
probably cut back by about five years of the length of time in development.
Within the incubator, new knowledge can be sourced from a variety of outlets.  
Since incubators typically have a good amount of entrepreneurs who come in for a 
while and then leave, these new entrepreneurs can become valuable sources of 
knowledge for other incubating entrepreneurs.  The cyclical nature of new people 
entering and others leaving an incubator helps to continually bring in new, novel 
sources of knowledge.  Stephen (2B) found that:
You see a lot of people come and go, which I think is good. The incubator 
helps to sort people’s heads out before they launch their venture.
Although the cyclical nature of an incubator is helpful in that it continuously brings 
in new people with new ideas, the number of businesses who go on to graduate 
from the incubator is small in comparison with the number of business that fail.  
Nevertheless, the act of bringing in new people with novel knowledge and ideas 
can be a valuable source for incubating entrepreneurs to escape a state of 
cognitive lock-in and connect with vital knowledge that helps their start-up grow.
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Too Little
In contrast to having too much cognitive proximity, some of the participants 
reported that there was a lack of cognitive proximity, which prevented knowledge 
from being understood between two actors involved in business incubation.  
Although knowledge was shared, the receiving entrepreneur failed to understand 
the new knowledge and was thus unable to absorb and apply it to their start-up.  
Several of the participating entrepreneurs found that they did not understand 
certain advisory support because it was ambiguous or overly difficult to 
understand.  Zak (1B) remarks:
And you think, why did the incubator not say this?  They probably did, but it 
wasn’t clear.
When too little cognitive proximity is present among actors, knowledge cannot be 
shared successfully.  In order to bridge this gap, the two parties must have some 
level of common knowledge between them.  In other words, knowledge acquisition 
requires similar, yet complementary bodies of knowledge.  As Cohendet and 
Llerena (1997) similarly found, this “same, but different” situation is necessary to 
trigger creativity and the development of new ideas.  Stephen (2B) found that he 
shared a common identity with other entrepreneurs:
Most people know everyone, but most of us are geeks - so you can have 
crazy conversations and we’ve done a lot of technical collaboration.
When entrepreneurs within an incubator can identify on such a level of common 
interest, there is immediately a common ground that allows them to communicate 
with one another.  Other entrepreneurs found that it was difficult to understand 
knowledge that was being communicated by an advisor because it was being told 
in such way that the entrepreneur did not hear the knowledge correctly.  Karrie 
(1A) described being caught in a place where she did not understand the advice 
that was given and suggested that 
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It would be nice if the incubator could inform tenants when they are about to 
get to an inflection point and who the right people are within the incubator 
network to talk with about it.
As Karrie (1A) discovered, there are certain stages in entrepreneurship that are 
best overcome with the help of certain actors.  An incubator has the potential to 
play a strategic role in helping to connect entrepreneurs with the right advisors.  If 
not, advisors might convey valuable knowledge to the entrepreneur without it 
being understood.
6.2.2 Just Right: Similar, Yet Different
In a perfect world, the business incubator helps entrepreneurs source valuable 
new knowledge as well as provide them with the tools to filter advisory support so 
that they are able to connect with and understand the right knowledge to grow 
their business.  Cognitive proximity can both support and prevent actors from 
being exposed to and understanding valuable new knowledge.  An incubator can 
assist to mediate this tension by helping entrepreneurs to not have too much or 
too little cognitive proximity.  By helping to get them the right balance in order to 
create more productive knowledge-sharing environments, entrepreneurs and 
incubators must be at balanced levels of cognitive proximity.
Many of the participants of this study reported that forming advisory teams, 
boards, and limiting those from whom they seek advisory support helps guide 
them through an excess of knowledge.  However, in doing so, actors can be prone 
to fall into a state of cognitive lock-in, whereby they become removed from diverse 
streams of knowledge and lack sources of novelty, sources which can be crucial 
for attaining valuable new knowledge.  In an effort to filter the valuable advice, 
actors might need to unlearn some habits or routines, which were once successful 
but have become redundant over time (e.g. Levitt and March, 1996).  Incubators 
can also help on this front by connecting entrepreneurs with actors who might 
possess valuable knowledge.  Nate (4B) found that the incubator staff has a 
unique skill of connecting entrepreneurs with the knowledge they needed, when 
they need it:
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Some of the staff have the ability in a couple hours per week to understand 
where you’re at, the key issues, and what help you need from other people.
Other than through helpful incubator personnel, the networks available in an 
incubator also provide avenues for entrepreneurs to bridge their learning gap.  
Luke (2C) remarks:
With the linkages through an incubator, an entrepreneur is able to be 
introduced to influential people that could help their business.  That’s a hard 
thing to do by yourself, even trying to get past a secretary.
However, not all incubators and not all networks are allowed to be accessed, 
particularly when there is a shortage of cognitive proximity.  Jared (1C) finds that 
outside support must meet three criteria in order for the incubator to connect the 
entrepreneur with an external actor.  He comments:
Connections have to happen on a variety of levels.  Strategically - can they 
actually add genuine value to the business?  It has to happen on a personal 
level - do they create a great relationship with the founding entrepreneur and 
the team that’s in there?  It’s also has got to happen on a level where they 
don’t become disruptive to the programmeme we’re running with the 
business.
As Jared (1C) points out, in some cases, the cost to source the right knowledge 
may be too great or even ineffective for learning.  However, too little cognitive 
proximity represents a lack of a point of connection between actors and may be 
mended through different tactics.
One tactic is for actors to discover mutual points of connection, which can be 
some type of shared knowledge between them.  In other words, they must find 
someone with a common knowledge base, but who also has diverse and 
complementary capabilities.  Boschma (2006) argues that an individual must 
search in close proximity for the knowledge they need.  Although incubators can 
help in establishing these connections, the responsibility of performing well does 
not solely fall on the incubator; the entrepreneur plays a key role in resolving their 
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own shortage or surplus of advisory tensions.   In fact, their success ultimately 
hinges on their own efforts.  As Zoe (4B) expresses, if an entrepreneur needs 
particular knowledge, they must not wait for the incubator to act but must pursue it 
themselves.  Zoe (4B) remarks:
One trap I’ve fallen into is, maybe its an age thing, I didn’t have much 
experience so I let people come over top and say “you should do this, you 
should do that, try that, do that” and what I’ve learned is that’s actually the 
wrong way to do it.  I know more about this company than anyone else so it’s 
about me going “right, I’m doing this and I need that, or I need that person’s 
perspective, or I need him to work out how we do this piece.”
As Zoe (4B) alludes, it is also up to the entrepreneurs to source the right methods 
to connect to that vital knowledge.  Claire (1A) observed that successful 
entrepreneurs, acknowledged their position of leadership and influence and take 
credit for the success or failure of their company.
I wear the success of my company myself.  I think that’s probably one of the 
common traits I see amongst successful entrepreneurs and equally one of 
the traits that is missing with people who are not successful - or are less 
successful in starting a business. 
Whether it’s the entrepreneur’s connection or the incubator’s, in terms of proximity, 
it is important that an entrepreneur finds points of connection with other actors so 
that they are able to communicate with as well as absorb new knowledge.  In 
short, knowledge sharing actors must be “similar, yet different.”
6.3 Organisational Proximity
Capital is often a key ingredient in entrepreneurship, but once start-ups have 
attracted investment, inter-organizational tensions tend to develop between 
entrepreneurs and their investors.  Whereas other tensions could be alleviated 
from both surpluses and shortages, the financial tensions concern a surplus of 
investor participation in the start-up, typically regarding advisory matters.  The data 
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showed that a surplus in financial support brought tension that could cause the 
entrepreneur to act on inadequate information that might prevent the start-up from 
reaching their potential.  Incubators can fulfil a vital role by stepping in to connect 
entrepreneurs with investors.  Luke (2C) remarks:
If you’re out there on your own, knocking on doors trying to raise money and 
you fall over, it’s a far more public flogging than if you fail in the incubator.
Similarly, Susan (2B) found:
Within a year, I have a substantial investor on board.  That could have not 
just happened out in the real world.
By inserting themselves in a mediating position between the entrepreneur and 
financial sources, the incubator positions itself to protect their own investment.  An 
incubator is a major stakeholder of incubating entrepreneurs.  Each of the 
participating incubators take at least a five percent non-dilutable equity stake in the 
start-up in exchange for the suite of services the incubator offers.  This equity 
position propels the incubator immediately into an investor role in the entity.  Since 
a New Zealand incubator is a shareholder in each of the incubated companies, it is 
in the incubator’s best interest to ensure their investment is ready to raise capital 
before they begin to make introductions, not only in order to protect their own 
investment, but also maintain their reputation with potential investors.  Susan (2B) 
found:
Backing a project in an incubator helps to give other investors confidence, 
partly because they know that the business will have the expertise to grow.
However, with their inheritance of influence, the incubator must wisely balance the 
ways in which they influence their incubating businesses with allowing the start-up 
to get on with what it’s trying to do.  Jeff (1D) comments:
We want to act like investors, we buy with our effort a portion of the company.
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Many of the times, the incubator tries to assert themselves as neutral, and some of 
the incubator employees might feel impartial themselves while other individuals 
might even have varying degrees of neutrality, however, taken as a whole the 
incubator and any of its employees or agents are far from neutral.  Boschma 
(2006) argues that organization proximity is needed to control the uncertainty and 
opportunism in knowledge creation between and within organizations.  Applied to 
relationships between investors and those firms in which they invest, 
organizational proximity can help distinguish and illustrate the tensions between 
members of different but related organizations.  These intra-organizational 
relationships bring much needed benefit, but as the study discovered, tensions 
regarding finance in particular can develop between start-ups and their investors.
6.3.1 Levels of Proximity
Organizational proximity can be best illustrated when two actors share a similar 
relational space that is typically based on certain shared interactions.  For 
example, these relationships are representative of a set of interdependencies 
within and between organizations that help to connect individuals of different 
organizations.  In the case discussed here, the financial dependency between 
entrepreneurs and their investors help to bring the two parties together.  As Cooke 
and Morgan (1998) discover, this organizational proximity is not only the 
mechanisms that helps to coordinate transactions of knowledge, but it is also a 
vehicle that enables the exchange of valuable information.
As illustrated above, inter-organizational relationships can be highly beneficial to 
start-ups, particularly their relationship with an incubator, other start-ups, advisors, 
and investors.  These relationships can provide important connections to different 
resources, like the knowledge and capital that new businesses need to succeed.
Although some investors play more active roles than others, there were no 
situations where investors were “under-involved” in the start-up.  Data did show, 
on the other hand, that those investors who were uninvolved, were completely 
uninvolved, and that the start-ups were typically left underfunded.  Incubators 
helped to bridge this gap by connecting investors with a new business.  Matt (3C) 
remarked:
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We advise, guide, connect, and help raise money, we don’t do it.  That’s a 
philosophy that we have.  They are the guys and girls that are driving the 
decisions, not us.
Although incubators typically have a higher level of responsibility for the outcome 
of their incubating entrepreneurs than Matt (3C) alludes, an incubator’s role is to 
help to establish inter-organizational relationships between their incubating tenants 
and financial investors. On the other hand, even though connections were made, 
the amount of both private and public funds available for start-ups in New Zealand 
is limited.  Stephen (2B) commented:
You almost want to give the finger to the government!  What did you do?  You 
did nothing.  And banks, oh my god, they’re even worse.  Therefore you need 
incubation.  Without the ability to raise money, your nothing.
As Stephen (2B) points out, the investment options in New Zealand and in many 
other parts of the world today are limited (e.g. Springall, 2012).  However, for those 
start-ups that have secured at least some level of investment from an incubator or 
others, there are financial tensions that can become inflamed with too much 
investor participation.
Too Much
The data tended to show that the relationships between a start-up and their 
investors can become asymmetric whereby the start-up becomes highly 
dependent and develops a surplus of investor participation.  Like advisory 
tensions, financial tensions may grow too strong and may then limit the access to 
various sources of novel information, since new knowledge often requires going 
outside of one’s current network.
Entrepreneurs typically allowed investors to highly influence their start-up.  It was 
especially challenging for the entrepreneur to mediate this relationship by seeing 
the two organizations as separate but related.  Zoe (4B) grew to view their 
incubator and her start-up as similar, particularly in behaviour.  She remarks: 
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We behave in very similar ways, there’s not much difference.
There is benefit to close organizational relationships.  For example, Jared (1C) 
described that his incubator ensures their new tenants are flexible and open to the 
incubators influence, both so that the incubator may do their job as well as earn a 
return on their investment.  He comments:
From an investment side, we look to see: is this a good investment?  Can we 
see ourselves working with them?  Are they coachable?  We do work on both 
the soft stuff and the hard stuff, to ensure it’ll be a good partnership.
Investors who confined start-ups to strict parameters and goals took away an 
entrepreneur’s flexibility to adapt and change.  These investors tended to desire a 
quick return on their investment, and some even as a result of their corporate 
backgrounds, typically favored hierarchical governance structures – neither of 
which provides the high level of flexibility needed to launch some start-ups.  Blanc 
and Sierra (1999) found, for example, that innovation requires organizational 
flexibility.  The more systematic the relations, such as in a bureaucratic system, the 
less often new ideas will be rewarded and interactive learning will take place.  As 
discussed with cognitive proximity, a type of lock-in can occur if an actor’s 
organizational proximity is too close.  The tighter the organizational arrangements, 
such as between start-ups and their investors, the less flexible and innovative the 
two organizations are as a result.
6.3.2 Just Right: Loosely Coupled System
A surplus of investor support can result in a state of lock-in that prevents 
entrepreneurs from connecting with the unique knowledge they might need.  To 
help confront this situation, the study tended to show that entrepreneurs and 
incubators can enact the alignment tactics reported in the findings section, which 
are: limiting investor influence and endorsing broad investor goals.  Although the 
study was unclear as to which of the two alignment tactics help best to reduce a 
surplus, one of the two tactics were typically of greater benefit depending on the 
individual entrepreneur and the stage of their start-up.
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In order to align investor relationships so that the entrepreneur did not fall into a 
state of lock-in requires balanced levels of organizational proximity.  Boschma 
(2006) discovered loosely, as opposed to tightly, coupled systems can help an 
individual to maximize benefit from both intra- and inter-organizational 
relationships and thus gain a necessary amount of flexibility.  A balanced level of 
organizational proximity guarantees network connections between organizations 
and thus helps to provide start-ups access to complementary sources of 
information within the pool of investors, without limiting their access to knowledge 
from other sources.  David (4C) has found that his incubator needs to take an 
active role in the incubating entrepreneur’s start-ups, but that there will be a point 
when they strategically remove themselves and to allow others advisors to be 
more involved.  He remarks:
We kind of see ourselves as being an add-on of their management team.  
Eventually we get replaced by other people.  But we’re a bit of a bolt-on 
member at the start.
Boschma (2006) explains that for loosely coupled systems to exist, organizations 
must maintain limited hiarchy without centralized units.  Coordination, however, is 
required to help bring together the different units (Lawson and Lorenz, 1999).  
Rachel (4D) found that her incubator’s culture helped to bring together the different 
incubating entrepreneurs, the incubator, and other’s who were invested in the 
start-up.  She remarks:
The culture kind of rains as the most important thing.  It’s all fluff, but it’s the 
tempo that helps everyone keep going and connect.
In sum, an excess of advisory support from investors can lead to an excess of 
organizational proximity and thus result in lock-in that prevents actors from gaining 
knowledge outside of their current sources.  Although this study tended to show 
that investor relationships can grow to become problematic, there can also be 
great benefit in tight relationships.  As Hanson (1999) realised, tight relationships 
can help actors transfer complex knowledge between organizations in product 
development projects.  Despite the different inter-organizational benefits from tight 
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and loose investor relationships, entrepreneurs and incubators alike must 
continually evaluate their level of openness to ensure they are preserving a 
balanced state of tension, between having a surplus and a shortage.  However, if a 
surplus does take effect, the two tactics of limiting investor influence and 
endorsing broad investor goals may help entrepreneurs to realign their unhinged 
relationships.
6.4 Social Proximity and Institutional Proximity
In differing levels of importance, the ethos of an incubator can help to connect 
entrepreneurs with the resources they need to succeed.  Typically these resources 
take the form of different sources of knowledge and psychological outcomes, such 
as increased self-confidence.  As reported in the Findings Chapter, these ethotic 
benefits tend to grow out of the incubator’s trusting and communally-minded 
environment.  Within this context, relationships between entrepreneurs were able 
to produce mutually beneficial outcomes, which previous research has also 
revealed.  Lichtenstein (1992), for example, discovered valuable benefits from 
peer relationships. In addition to this, other researchers found many benefits that 
can develop from the other relationships in incubation (e.g. Hansen et al., 2000; 
Bollingtoft and Ulhoi, 2005).
Boschma (2006) offers some unique lenses to view the ethotic tensions raised in 
this study.  His view of social proximity, institutional proximity, and the relationship 
between these two forms of proximity provide a good illustration of this theme.  
The concept of social proximity shows the importance of relationships at the micro-
level.  High levels of social proximity imply relationships that involve trust based on 
friendship, kinship and shared experience.  Embeddedness literature helps to 
shed additional light on this concept by suggesting that social embeddedness in a 
firm’s relationships is positively correlated with interactive learning and innovative 
performance (e.g. Granovetter, 1985).
As revealed in the Findings Chapter, start-ups within incubation are separate yet can 
be intimately connected.  Although each firm associates with all other firms on an 
intra-firm level, the common location of incubation helps to eliminate walls 
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between organizations and allows incubating start-ups to associate more with one 
another on an inter-firm level.  Whereas social proximity focuses on the social ties 
or connections that develop relationships, it does not include shared sets of 
values, such as from religious perspectives or ethnic backgrounds.  Those values 
and others at the macro-level are classified under the concept of institutional 
proximity.  As Boschma (2006) explains, institutions function as a sort of glue for 
collective action because it reduces uncertainty and lowers transaction costs, 
while also increasing certainty within the institution.
6.4.1 Levels of Proximity
Much of the ethotic benefits in incubation tend to stem from mutually beneficial 
friendship, which thrived because of a considerable amount of social proximity.  In 
other words, the relationships were based on friendship, kinship, and shared 
experience.  This social proximity helped contribute to the sharing of knowledge as 
well as the providing of psychological support, such as a boost to an 
entrepreneur’s self-confidence.  However, an excessive amount of social proximity 
can be detrimental to an actor.  Too much commitment may lock members of 
social networks, like incubators, into established ways of doing things at the 
expense of their own innovative and learning capacity.  Without being able to 
connect with valuable new knowledge, start-ups will then find themselves trapped 
without the key resources to grow and develop.
Coupled with and related to social proximity, the concept of institutional proximity 
helps to further explain the ethotic tension discovered in incubation.  Institutions 
are established sets of common habits, routines, practices, rules, or laws that help 
to regulate the relations and interactions between actors and groups.  Institutional 
proximity can then be seen either as an enabling or constraining mechanism that 
affects the level of knowledge transfer, interactive learning, and consequently the 
innovativeness of the firm.  As observed in this study, institutional proximity 
represents how closely the incubating entrepreneur “behaves” according to the 
incubator expectations.  With too little institutional proximity, actors may lack the 
social cohesion and common values that help establish relationships and create a 
climate for knowledge transfer. On the opposing spectrum, too much can lead to a 
state of inertia whereby accretive institutional proximity hampers collective learning 
97
and innovation.  A state of inertia or lock-in tends to hinder the development of new 
innovations which require, as a condition, the build-up of new or the restructuring 
of old institutional structures.  Freeman and Perez (1988) in their work on 
technology systems found that new ideas and innovations were obstructed by 
increased institutional proximity, which blinds ones ability to see new possibilities.
When an actor’s field of vision is either increased or impaired with a shortage or 
surplus social proximity and institutional proximity, a balance must be struck to 
ensure actors are in a state to capitalize on ethotic benefits.  This study tended to 
reveal that actors were either dependent upon or independent of ethotic support 
available in incubation.  In other words, dependent actors tended to struggle with 
lock-in from a surplus of social and institutional proximity whereas independent 
actors maintained low levels or a shortage of these proximities and failed to benefit 
much from ethotic support.  
Too Much or Too Little
Incubating entrepreneurs tended to be either too involved in the incubator or not 
involved enough.  Each of these poles came with different issues that negatively 
contributed to an entrepreneur’s venture.  
With too much institutional proximity, start-ups were prone to get caught in the 
incubator’s system and processes.  Jessica (3D) commented:
When I first came to the incubator a couple of years back, I did my normal 
corporate thing and I tried to help a couple of entrepreneurs become more 
process oriented.  I beautifully laid out this process, but the human elements 
played constantly and I quickly determined, maybe unscientifically, that good 
incubation requires a mixture of art and science.
As Jessica (3D) found, having an abundance of structure prevented them from 
connecting with innovative new knowledge.  On the other hand, the data also 
reported that when an entrepreneur chooses to be more independent and they 
invest too little time and energy into the incubator itself, they are not able to yield 
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the ethotic benefits.  Caleb (3A) found that problems occurred when start-ups 
stayed more independent.  He comments:
You tend to get a lot from the incubator if you actively engage in it, for those 
who didn’t engage, that’s where the problem is.
Zak (1B) remarks:
It’s probably my fault as well for not engaging with those guys (the incubator), 
so that I got the best out of them.
Those entrepreneurs who rely on the incubator for some things but can 
simultaneously maintain a healthy level of independence are best able to realise 
the ethotic benefits of incubation.  Taken together, in order to realise the most 
benefits from incubation, entrepreneurs must maintain a permeable community.
6.4.2 Just Right: Permeable Community
Zoe (4B) realised that once someone first discovers the many benefits available 
from being involved in the incubator, they are able to connect with valuable new 
knowledge.  She remarks:
Now that I’ve been working with everyone (in the incubator) I have a clear 
picture of who is good at what.  So I try and manage it that way, rather than 
asking everyone.  You just go: “he’s good at that, I’ll just ask him.”
The different relationships in incubation have the potential to result in substantial 
ethotic benefits.  Some actors, on the other hand, were also prone to grow 
dependent on ethotic benefits causing them to become locked-in or constrained to 
limited sources of knowledge. Those actors who were less involved also limited 
themselves by not engaging in the incubator and failed to capitalize from any 
available ethotic benefits.
Although an incubator’s ethos can be a powerful tool in connecting entrepreneurs 
with others in the network to the valuable knowledge and psychological support 
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they need, many of the participants found themselves unable to capitalize on 
these benefits because they were either too dependent upon this knowledge or 
completely removed and independent from these resources.  As a result, this 
study revealed that the actors involved in incubation must strike a balance 
between these two poles.  In other words, they must find ways to connect with the 
incubator’s ethotic benefits without growing to be dependent upon them.  
Permeable community might be the appropriate language to describe such a 
balanced approach.  Something that is permeable has a defined structure but 
allows things – particularly liquids and gases – to pass in and out.  A permeable 
community then would be one that retains the exclusivity, the shared experiences, 
and language of a collective, but which is open to the benefits of knowing new 
people and bringing exposure to external ideas.  Boschma (2006) talks about 
social proximity as needing to maintain a balanced mix of both market 
relationships, where individuals keep a fair distance between one another, and 
embedded relationships where social proximity is particularly strong in order to 
help circumvent issues and increase innovative performance.  Gordon and 
McCann (2000) argue that agglomerations, or a large collective, can also help to 
compensate for the lock-in or dependent aspect of social proximity.  For 
institutional proximity, Boschma (2006) argues that misaligned institutional 
proximity requires checks and balances, which help create a balance between 
institutional stability, openness, and flexibility.  Regardless of the form of proximity 
- whether formal (laws and rules) or informal (cultural norms and habits) - a 
balance is required to ensure both openness and connectivity.  In other words, 
actors must seek to retain permeable community by ensuring a balance between 
being independent of and dependent upon the incubator.
Incubating entrepreneurs, who have maintained a sense of permeable community, 
have the unique state of benefiting from both the ethotic benefits of incubation as 
well as the other benefits, such as new knowledge, that comes from sources 
outside of the incubator.  Stephen (2B) comments on his experience: 
It’s not really the building.  The network you build and this is one thing you 
learn from being in the incubator.  Even outside of being involved my start-
up, and no matter what kind of job you may get next, your network is your 
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name and your name is everything.  It carries beyond whatever you do now.  
I now know most of the powerful people in New Zealand, and I’m just 
Stephen.  How did that happen?  It happened because of this and I get to 
take that with me.  How do you buy it?  You can’t, it’s like insane.
Simply on a relational level, by maintaining a sense of permeable community, the 
incubating entrepreneur is not only able to connect with diverse groups of people, 
but as Susan (2B) finds, they are also able to protect themselves from other 
individuals who doubt that they will be able to successfully launch the venture:
One of the really valuable things for me has been that while I had this one 
problem with this one person, which could have absolutely destroyed me if 
that would have been the only relationship I had in this building, the fact that I 
had another two people I could turn to pulled me through that problem.
6.5 Geographic Proximity
The fifth category of Boschma’s (2006) proximity framework is geographic 
proximity.  Although, this proximity fails to match directly with one of the three 
tensions reported in the findings section, it does simultaneously support each of 
the tensions in differing acuteness.  For example, Karrie (1A) made the decision to 
physically relocate to a city she perceived as more helpful for her as an 
entrepreneur starting off.  She remarks:
I found that people here were much more willing to talk and provide advice at 
such an early stage, as opposed to other cities and countries I’ve lived.
Geographic proximity has long been seen as the key form of proximity that 
physically brings relationships together.  Research indicates that those agents who 
are spatially concentrated benefit from knowledge externalities (e.g. Audretsch and 
Feldman, 1996).  When entering the incubator, Whitney (1A) was not expecting 
benefits from being physically proximate with other entrepreneurs and incubator 
staff, but after a while she found that the geographic proximity helped to connect 
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her with people who had new knowledge her business could benefit from.  She 
remarks:
Physical space was the key ingredient for this, it provided an opportunity for 
individuals to connect - especially those who thought initially they might not 
have anything in common.
This act of being present in a physical location has long been observed in highly 
innovative and connected places, like Silicon Valley.  In a study of this geographic 
space filled with technology companies Audretsch and Feldman, (1996) found that 
those firms near knowledge sources tend to show a better innovative performance 
than firms located elsewhere.  However, Boschma (2006) and others (e.g. 
Davenport, 2005) have shown, an actor’s physical distance is not the only spatial 
factor that helps or hinders relationships between other economic actors.  Antonelli 
(2000) argues that although firms might be geographically close to one another, 
they still require other forms of proximity such as cognitive proximity in order for 
them to absorb and process new external knowledge.  Boschma (2006) builds on 
this argument by finding that other forms of proximity, particularly cognitive 
proximity, can act as a substitute for geographic proximity.  In other words, 
individuals are able to benefit from the shared knowledge in Silicon Valley, not 
necessarily because they are neighbors, although that might help, but because 
they share a similar interest in something like technology.  Ben (2A), an 
entrepreneur, remarked that he found early on that there were different 
applications of the same product in different countries.  By using the knowledge he 
knew about his product and by working to understand what the different 
applications of his product were, he was able to bridge the cognitive and 
geographic proximity gaps and earn new customers and develop new 
partnerships.
Current models for business incubation are premised on geographic proximity.  
Each of the participating incubators in this study was based in a geographic place 
where they both had their office and sourced the majority of their incubating 
entrepreneurs.  Since this was the case, incubators were premised first on growing 
local businesses that impacted their own city’s economy as well as that of the 
country.  However, as shown in this study, geographic proximity is only one of the 
102
many forms of proximity, and incubating entrepreneurs are not able to 
advantageously connect unless optimal levels of proximity are cultivated and 
maintained.  What this means for practicing business incubators is that they must 
ensure they are not solely focused on their geographic proximity, but that they take 
into account the other forms in all aspects of incubation, from recruitment of 
prospective incubating entrepreneurs to the different key people they connect to 
help their incubating businesses.  In New Zealand, this might include incubators 
sharing particular individuals who specialize in certain knowledge.  In other words, 
if an incubating entrepreneur requires expertise located outside of their geographic 
area, they must be connected with it.  Sarah (2D) remarked:
Maybe there are people across the country that the incubators need to share. 
Some people are so valuable for the industry, that it doesn’t make sense just 
to hold onto them tight and not let them work with anyone else - but instead 
to make that expertise available.
Additionally certain incubators in New Zealand could become less known for their 
geographical location as for their specialization.  Specialised incubators could 
mean each incubator focuses on start-ups involved in particular sectors or 
industries.  Caleb (3A), who found that his start-up failed to establish many strong 
connections because his company wasn’t in the ICT space, commented:
I can see the value of incubators having specialist areas and sectors, you 
can’t have one broad spectrum incubator.
For this to develop, a sector-specific network of advisors and investors must be 
established.  These are professionals who know a particular space and can 
provide incubating entrepreneurs who are creating start-ups in their space, with 
valuable knowledge.
In sum, successful management of the tensions highlighted here require a balance 
of each of the areas of proximity.  Other forms of proximity can compensate for 
limited geographic proximity and an excess of proximity weakens the learning 
ability of locals because they are too inward looking.  In other words, similar to the 
ways in which individuals can experience lock-in from too much cognitive 
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proximity, an abundance of geographic proximity can also create a sense of lock-in 
which can prevent an individual from connecting with new knowledge that might be 
physically located elsewhere.  To mediate, those actors involved in business 
incubation must make a conscious effort to maintain balanced levels of proximities 
so that incubating entrepreneurs are able to connect to the resources they need.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Research
Incubation can be a powerful instrument to serve entrepreneurs by connecting 
them with the tools they need to develop and grow, if tensions are well managed.  
Boschma’s (2006) social capital framework helps to illustrate each of the three 
tensions reported in the findings section.  By viewing these tensions through each 
of Boschma’s (2006) proximity lenses, one is better able to understand the 
incubation process and how to realign unbalanced tensions.  According to the 
data, there can either be too much, to little, or just the right amount of the different 
proximities.  As is the nature of tensions, if there is a surplus or a shortage of 
something, then the involved actors are left at a disadvantage.  However, a 
shortage or a surplus of one area of proximity can be mended with the help of 
certain techniques that either increase the level of proximity or decrease it.  The 
following conclusion offers a summary of the research presented here and unveils 
a number of ideas for future research. 
7.1 Key Relationships: Central Participants and their 
Stakeholders
This study revealed that there are tensions that exist in the incubator environment 
which are as much about the relationship between the two central participants - 
incubator personnel and entrepreneur - and other stakeholders, as between the 
two central participants themselves.  Several of the entrepreneurs pointed to the 
broader ecosystem as a key driver in helping provide them the knowledge they 
need to move beyond the start-up phase.  This includes both stakeholders they 
knew before incubation and ones they met during and through incubation.  These 
heterogeneous sources of information help to trigger knowledge transfer because 
they involve actors with dissimilar, yet complementary areas of mutual 
understanding.  However, they also bring about different advisory, financial, and 
ethotic tensions, which leaves the entrepreneur or incubator to manage their levels 
of proximity so that they are maximizing their advantage.
105
7.2 Role of Proximity in Business Incubation
Geographic proximity was long assumed to be the key driver in effective 
knowledge transfer; although, recently with social capital research from Boschma 
(2006) and others (e.g. Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Davenport and Daellenbach, 
2011), various new forms of proximity, such as cognitive, institutional, and 
organizational have been shown to be of greater effectiveness than geographic.  
Although, there were exceptions, each of the business incubators who participated 
in this study was focused on serving a geographic-specific area of entrepreneurs 
who had high-growth potential.  In other words, incubators are very much 
premised on geographic proximity.  However, as highlighted above, organizational, 
institutional, cognitive, and social proximity have equally important roles that need 
to be taken into account and, at times, emphasised over geographic proximity.
7.3 Remedies: Calculated Levels of Diversity
This study found that tensions exist in business incubation and that tensions may 
be mended by way of applying a number of remedies that help to strategically 
ensure diversity, rather than succumbing to uniformity.  These diverse, yet similar, 
relationships help to position a start-up to acquire and disseminate the valuable 
knowledge they need to lead their start-up beyond the early stages of business 
and on to sustainable and growing ventures.
Cognitive proximity, for example, allows actors to share a common knowledge 
base and expertise so they may learn from one another.  Boschma (2006) argues 
that cognitive proximity is a prerequisite for knowledge sharing, more so even than 
geographic proximity.  As it relates to business incubation, incubating 
entrepreneurs must surround themselves with an optimal level of cognitive 
proximity, and they will not be able to connect with all the advantages if they have 
too much or too little.
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7.4 Future Research
The lessons learned here may be useful for practitioners involved in business 
incubation - both on the incubator and entrepreneur sides.  Additionally, these 
lessons may help an entrepreneur engaged in some form of start-up assistance, 
such as in corporate ventures, in technology or business parks, and business 
assistance programmes offered to members through a local Chamber of 
Commerce.
This research has opened up a number of interesting doors for future research, 
both for academics and practitioners.  Three additional angles of prospective 
research will be suggested here.  
First, a long-term study of incubation may help to further illustrate the tensions 
raised in this thesis while also revealing how practitioners may further balance 
tensions from becoming too great.  An extended study could include the tracking of 
several participants from the time they enter the incubator through to when they 
graduate while also incorporating interviews with individuals a part of the broader 
network of incubation.  This could include government leaders, investors, and 
other key incubator and the entrepreneur’s stakeholders.  Such a study would 
allow for a more comprehensive view of the progression of an entrepreneur 
through incubation.
Second, one limitation of this study is that it solely investigated one incubator 
system in one country.  Although the 25 participants of this study came from one of 
four different incubators, future research that takes a multi-country and even multi-
region view of incubation could be helpful to test and validate the tensions raised 
in this study.  
Third, for practitioners, this study can be used as the basis for creating a 
benchmarking tool for gauging the effectiveness of incubation by identifying why 
an actor may have too much or too little of one tension and by addressing their 
imbalance through fueling initiatives for the purposes of realignment.  A 
benchmarking tool could not only help support an incubator, but it could also help 
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entrepreneurs to track their incubation experience.  Ways for entrepreneurs to 
gauge their incubation experience have not typically been been developed or 
published, but such a tool might be beneficial not only to incubating entrepreneurs, 
but also to individuals who are considering bringing their start-up into an incubator. 
7.5 Concluding Statement
In sum, as New Zealand seeks to grow its GDP in part through business 
incubation, practitioners and researchers must account for other elements of 
proximity, beyond geographic.  To ensure entrepreneurs are given the advantages 
they need to succeed, an optimal, or “just right” level of cognitive, social, 
institutional, organizational, and geographic proximity must be cultivated and 
maintained.  With balanced levels of proximity, entrepreneurs are equipped to 
realise the advantages of hatching their venture together with an incubator.
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Information Handout 
 
Research title 
 
Hatching prosperity together.  A critical assessment of relationships and business incubation in New 
Zealand. 
 
Research overview 
 
I am a Masters of Commerce student at Victoria.    I’m  embarking  on  some  research  in  the  New  
Zealand business incubator space. 
 
This study seeks to explore perspectives of entrepreneurs and incubator managers on how 
relationships impact successful high-growth start-up develop in New Zealand business incubators. 
 
How will you be affected? 
 
 Each interview will be 30-60 minutes in duration.  A range of views, experiences, and 
opinions are being sought. 
 Participation is entirely voluntary.  You are not obligated to participate. 
 Participants will be interviewed individually and confidentially.  Interviews will be reported in 
an aggregated, non-attributable form.  A position descriptor and a pseudo-name will be used 
in the report in place of participant’s  real  name. 
 The interview will be recorded. 
 Other than the Researcher (Brock Starnes), only his Supervisor (Dr. Sally Davenport) will 
have access to the interview data.   
 Participants may withdraw themselves or any information they have provided from this project 
anytime before March 30th, 2012, without having to supply a reason for doing so.  All data 
from withdrawn participants will be destroyed immediately. 
 All data will be stored  free  of  any  identifiable  details  and  destroyed  two  years  after  the  study’s  
conclusion. 
 Should you request it, a summary of Findings and Conclusions will be forwarded to you after 
all analysis has been completed.  I will also make myself available to provide feedback 
through presentations at the organisation sites if requested by participant individuals.  (This 
will be no earlier than July 2012.)   
 Ethical approval from Victoria University of Wellington has been obtained for the purpose of 
this research. 
 All participants will sign a Consent Form 
 
The researcher 
 
Brock Starnes is currently a Masters of Commerce and Administration (MCA) student at Victoria 
University of Wellington.  This study is being conducted as part of the requirements for the completion 
of the above degree. 
 
Contact information 
 
Please  contact  either  of  those  listed  below  if  you’d  like  further  information. 
 
Researcher: Brock Starnes 
Email: brock.starnes@vuw.ac.nz Phone: 022 081 57 07 
 
Supervisor: Sally Davenport, Professor of Management, VUW 
Email: sally.davenport@vuw.ac.nz Phone: 04 463 51 44 
Appendix B: Participation Consent Form
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Participation Consent Form 
 
Research overview 
 
This study seeks to explore perspectives of entrepreneurs and incubator managers on how 
relationships impact successful high-growth start-up develop in New Zealand business incubators. 
 
Purpose of agreement 
 
This agreement is to ensure that you are sufficiently informed about the purpose of the research, 
and your right to confidentiality. 
 
Consent to participation 
 
 I have been given an explanation and have understood this research project. 
 I have had an opportunity to ask any questions and have them answered. 
 I understand the interview will be recorded. 
 Should I request it, a summary of Findings and Conclusions and/or feedback through 
presentations at the organisation sites will be provided after all analysis has been 
completed.  This will be no earlier than July 2012. 
 I understand that I may withdraw myself or any information I have provided from this 
project anytime before March 30th, 2012, without having to supply a reason for doing so. 
 I understand that I will be interviewed individually and confidentially and that my interview 
will be reported in an aggregated, non-attributable form.  A position descriptor and a 
pseudo-name will be used in the report in place of my real name.   
 Please circle or write in a position descriptor and one pseudo-name: 
 
Position 
Descriptor 
Incubatee Incubator 
Graduate 
Incubator 
CEO 
Incubator 
Manager 
Other: 
_______________ 
    
Pseudo-name Claire Susan Karrie Sam Zoe 
Ben Mark Luke Patrick Sarah 
Katie Whitney Zak Rachel Jessica 
Matt Caleb Trevor Bobby Frasier 
Stephen Nate David Other: ________________ 
 
 
Participant      Researcher 
 
Signature: _____________________   Signature: _____________________  
 
 
Name: ________________________   Name: ________________________  
 
 
Date: _________________________   Date: _________________________  
 
 
